



In Defense of the Short Cut 
Stephen M. Johnson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress frequently gives administrative agencies a choice of 
several different tools—including legislative rulemaking, nonlegislative 
rulemaking, and adjudication—to interpret and apply the statutes that 
they administer.1  When Congress gives agencies a choice, courts rarely 
second-guess the agencies’ choice of policymaking tool.2  Rarely, that is, 
unless the agency chooses to interpret a statute through nonlegislative 
rulemaking. 
In theory, an agency should be able to announce an interpretation of 
a statute through a policy statement, interpretive rule, or other form of 
nonlegislative rule—often referred to more generally as “guidance 
documents”—without incurring the costs or delay of notice-and-
comment rulemaking.3  As long as the agency does not treat that policy 
decision as binding and justifies the decision when applying it to a 
concrete factual situation, there should be nothing legally objectionable 
about the agency’s action.4 
Nevertheless, regulated entities and regulatory beneficiaries 
frequently challenge nonlegislative rules before the agency applies them, 
arguing that the policy decisions are really legislative rules and thus 
invalid because they were adopted without notice-and-comment 
procedures.5  In response, courts have fashioned a variety of unworkable 
                                                          
 *  Associate Dean and Professor, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University; B.S., 
J.D., Villanova University; LL.M., George Washington University School of Law. 
 1. See infra notes 31–36 and accompanying text. 
 2. See infra notes 72–81 and accompanying text. 
 3. See Stephen M. Johnson, Good Guidance, Good Grief!, 72 MO. L. REV. 695, 698–702 
(2007) (discussing nonlegislative rulemaking and the reasons underlying its use). 
 4. Id. at 707–08. 
 5. See, e.g., David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the 
Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 294–303 (2010) (discussing various challenges to rules promulgated 
without notice-and-comment procedures); William Funk, When Is a “Rule” a Regulation? Marking 
a Clear Line Between Nonlegislative Rules and Legislative Rules, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 659, 660–61 
(2002) (same); M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
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tests to distinguish between legislative and nonlegislative rules, and they 
have frequently struck down nonlegislative rules by characterizing them 
as invalid legislative rules that the agency should have promulgated 
through notice-and-comment procedures.6 
Many academics have criticized these tests and suggested that a 
court, in reviewing an agency’s policy decision, should simply look at 
the procedures that the agency used to make the decision.7  If the agency 
did not use notice-and-comment rulemaking, the reformers argue, then 
the court should conclude that the agency’s policy decision is a 
nonlegislative rule instead of concluding that it is an invalid legislative 
rule.8  The agency may then apply that nonlegislative rule to concrete 
factual situations, but it must independently and rationally justify its 
decision in those cases and cannot simply point to the nonlegislative rule 
as a source of binding authority.9 
This proposal has generated much scholarly debate.  Critics argue 
that the proposal reduces public input in the decision-making process and 
reduces judicial oversight because agencies’ nonlegislative rules are 
frequently not reviewable in court.10  Supporters of the proposal counter 
by claiming that it does not eliminate public or judicial oversight of 
nonlegislative rules but merely delays review until the agencies apply the 
policy decisions in a concrete factual setting.11  Further, supporters argue 
that agencies will frequently articulate their most significant policy 
decisions in legislative rules adopted through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking because such rules will be binding and entitled greater 
deference upon review.12 
The debate has continued in recent articles by Professors David 
Franklin and Mark Seidenfeld.13  Franklin argues that courts have 
                                                                                                                       
1383, 1411–12 (2004) (discussing such challenges generally); see also Andrew Childers, EPA 
Guidance on Polluter Fees Violates Clean Air Act, NRDC Tells Appeals Court, 42 Env’t Rep. 
(BNA) 1032 (May 13, 2011); Linda Roeder, 170 House Members Call EPA Guidance on Water Act 
Jurisdiction “De Facto Rule”, 42 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 872 (Apr. 22, 2011). 
 6. See infra notes 103–04 and accompanying text. 
 7. See, e.g., Funk, supra note 5, at 663; Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1705, 1719 (2007); John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
893, 931 (2004). 
 8. See sources cited supra note 7. 
 9. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1490–91 (1992); 
Funk, supra note 5, at 664, 671; Johnson, supra note 3, at 707–08. 
 10. See infra notes 155–67 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 168–74 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 168–74 and accompanying text. 
 13. See Franklin, supra note 5; Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural 
Review of Guidance Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331 (2011). 
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appropriately rejected the proposal—which he deems the “short cut”—
because there are many situations where agencies’ nonlegislative rules 
will be unreviewable yet will directly and concretely impact regulated 
entities and regulatory beneficiaries.14  He also asserts that agencies will 
not use notice-and-comment rulemaking for major policy decisions, as 
supporters of the short cut assert, because courts will accord agencies’ 
decisions made through nonlegislative rulemaking or adjudication a 
similar amount of deference as decisions made through legislative 
rulemaking.15  Finally, he argues that even if there is some opportunity 
for public participation in policymaking when a party challenges an 
agency’s application of a nonlegislative rule, the nature and level of this 
public participation differs significantly from the participation in 
legislative rulemaking.16 
Seidenfeld, on the other hand, defends the short cut but concedes that 
it does reduce public and judicial oversight of agency policymaking.17  
Accordingly, he proposes modifications of the standard of review for 
nonlegislative rules and the doctrines of ripeness and finality.18  Such 
modifications would allow nonlegislative rules to be challenged 
immediately upon adoption and require that courts apply a more rigorous 
standard of review.19 
Seidenfeld’s proposal, however, could provide a disincentive to 
agencies’ use of nonlegislative rulemaking, encouraging adjudication 
rather than legislative rulemaking.20  A shift to adjudication would not 
significantly increase public participation in agency decision-making and 
would reduce advance notice to regulated entities and regulatory 
beneficiaries regarding agencies’ interpretations of the laws they 
administer.21 
Seidenfeld and earlier advocates of the short cut are correct that the 
test is much easier to apply than current tests and more faithful to basic 
principles of administrative law.22  In addition, the short cut is more 
consistent with congressional intent regarding agencies’ choice of 
                                                          
 14. See Franklin, supra note 5, at 308–12. 
 15. Id. at 312–16, 320–23. 
 16. Id. at 317–19. 
 17. See Seidenfeld, supra note 13, at 341–44. 
 18. Id. at 373–75. 
 19. Id. at 375–78. 
 20. See infra Part V.D. 
 21. See infra Part V.D. 
 22. See infra notes 200–09 and accompanying text. 
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policymaking form.23  If Congress has given an agency discretion to 
interpret a statute through legislative rulemaking, nonlegislative 
rulemaking, or adjudication, then courts should honor that directive.24 
Franklin and Seidenfeld are correct, however, that in some cases the 
short cut may reduce public and judicial oversight over agency 
policymaking.25  Reforms to address those limitations should increase 
public and judicial oversight without significantly increasing the cost to 
the agency of making decisions through nonlegislative rules.  Regarding 
judicial oversight, this Article proposes an expansion of judicial review 
for nonlegislative rules in cases where an agency is unlikely to apply a 
nonlegislative rule to a concrete factual situation.  Such cases exist when 
an agency decides to deregulate or not enforce the law or regulations in 
specific instances.26  This approach addresses the concerns about limited 
judicial review under the short cut in a manner that is consistent with the 
true nature of nonlegislative rules; it achieves this, however, without 
greatly expanding the circumstances in which a claimant may bring a 
lawsuit. 
Regarding public participation, this Article advocates amendment of 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to require an agency to post 
significant guidance documents on the Internet, allow an opportunity for 
public comment on those documents, and post the comments on the 
Internet, without requiring the agency to prepare a “concise general 
statement of the basis and purpose” of the guidance or respond to the 
comments.27  Although I opposed an increase in procedures for guidance 
documents in an earlier article,28 agencies have adhered to these 
procedures for several years, at the direction of the White House Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB),29 without a legislative mandate; the 
procedures have not appeared to cause any significant shift away from 
nonlegislative rulemaking.  The proposal would only apply to significant 
guidance documents, so the impact would be minimal and targeted at 
                                                          
 23. See infra notes 251–53 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra notes 251–53 and accompanying text. 
 25. See Franklin, supra note 5, at 324; Seidenfeld, supra note 13, at 332–33; infra notes 195–96 
and accompanying text. 
 26. See infra Part V.G.2. 
 27. See infra Part V.G.1. 
 28. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 696–97 (stating that agencies would be better served with 
general requirements when adopting procedures for notice-and-comment rulemaking). 
 29. See Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3432–33 (Jan. 
25, 2007) (discussing agencies’ reliance on guidance documents and their general importance to 
agencies). 
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those nonlegislative rules that are likely to raise the greatest concerns 
among regulated entities and regulatory beneficiaries.  The proposal is 
also consistent with the current Administration’s focus on e-rulemaking 
and increasing participation and transparency in government.30 
It might even be appropriate, as part of the legislation to expand 
judicial review and public participation, to require agencies to notify 
Congress when they adopt significant guidance documents.  Because the 
guidance documents and public comments would be accessible on the 
Internet, members of Congress could review them and determine whether 
it was necessary to require agencies to make specific decisions or types 
of decisions through legislative rulemaking. 
Part II of this Article explores the variety of policymaking tools that 
are available to agencies, the deference generally accorded an agency’s 
choice of tool, and the reluctance of courts to defer when agencies 
choose to make policy through nonlegislative rulemaking.  Part III 
explores Franklin’s criticism of the short cut as an alternative to the 
current tests used to distinguish legislative rules from nonlegislative 
rules.  Part IV outlines Seidenfeld’s proposal to reform judicial review of 
nonlegislative rules to allow courts to adopt the short cut without limiting 
public and judicial oversight.  Finally, Part V critiques the proposals of 
Franklin and Seidenfeld and introduces the proposal for an expansion of 
electronic participation in the development of significant guidance 
documents and a modest expansion of judicial review for nonlegislative 
rules. 
II. LEGISLATIVE RULES, NONLEGISLATIVE RULES, ADJUDICATION, AND 
AGENCY CHOICE 
A. Agency Policymaking Tools and Agency Choice 
 Congress frequently authorizes administrative agencies to interpret 
and apply the statutes that they administer through a variety of tools, 
including legislative rulemaking, adjudication, and nonlegislative 
rulemaking.31  The precise mix of tools available to an agency depends 
upon the statutes that empower the agency to regulate.32  To implement 
                                                          
 30. See infra notes 323–24 and accompanying text. 
 31. See Magill, supra note 5, at 1386. 
 32. Id. at 1387.  Although Congress normally must use explicit language to grant legislative 
rulemaking authority, enforcement authority, or other adjudicatory authority, the Supreme Court has 
held that a statute that authorizes an agency to gather information and judicially enforce the statute 
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the Clean Water Act, for example, Congress authorized the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to use the full range of 
policymaking tools.33  By contrast, when Congress authorized the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to implement Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act, it did not authorize the EEOC to promulgate 
legislative rules.34  Just as Congress may limit an agency’s choice of 
policymaking tools by withholding the power to use a specific tool, as in 
the EEOC example, Congress may limit the agency’s choice by 
requiring the agency to use a specific tool.  For instance, Congress 
required the EPA to use legislative rulemaking to set certain water-
quality standards under the Clean Water Act35 and to establish methods 
for identifying and listing hazardous wastes under the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act.36 
If an agency has a choice regarding the tools that it may use to 
interpret and implement the statute it administers, several factors might 
influence the agency’s choice in a particular situation.  These include the 
procedures required, the audiences involved in the decision-making, the 
effect of the decision, and the amount of deference accorded by courts to 
the agency’s decision. 
First, there are different procedural requirements for each tool.  In 
order to adopt a legislative rule, an agency must publish the proposed 
rule in the Federal Register, provide the public with an opportunity to 
comment on the proposed rule, and publish the final rule with a concise 
general statement of the basis and purpose for the rule.37  In many cases, 
the OMB must review the rule prior to publication.38  If, on the other 
hand, an agency chooses to interpret a statute or regulation on a case-by-
case basis through adjudication, the agency may have to follow trial-type 
procedures if the agency’s statutory authority requires formal 
                                                                                                                       
also grants the authority to issue rules interpreting the statute regardless of whether the statute 
explicitly grants such authority.  Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944). 
 33. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(b), 1361(a) (2006) (authorizing EPA Administrator to bring judicial 
enforcement actions and promulgate legislative rules); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (authorizing 
administrative enforcement actions). 
 34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2006) (authorizing only procedural regulations). 
 35. See 33 U.S.C. § 1316. 
 36. See 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b) (2006). 
 37. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).  In rare situations, Congress may require an agency to promulgate a 
rule through a formal rulemaking process, which involves trial-type proceedings.  See 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553(c) (applying §§ 556 and 557 when a statute requires rulemaking on the record rather than in 
the Federal Register); see also 5 U.S.C. § 554 (establishing procedures for adjudication hearings 
when rulemaking must be made on the record). 
 38. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
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adjudication.39  The OMB will not, however, participate in that process.40  
If the statute merely requires informal adjudication, then few mandatory 
procedures apply, and there will be no OMB involvement.41  The final 
tool, nonlegislative rulemaking, which includes general statements of 
policy and interpretive rules, is exempt from the notice-and-comment 
process and most other procedures.42  OMB reviews only a small 
category of these rules.43 
Just as the procedures an agency must follow vary greatly depending 
on the agency’s choice of policymaking tool, the audiences that 
participate in an agency’s decision-making also vary significantly.  
Legislative rulemaking affords the broadest opportunity for public 
participation because the agency provides nationwide notice of the 
proposed rule, which allows any interested person to submit comments 
on the rules.44  The audience involved in an agency’s decision-making is 
more limited with formal adjudication and usually only includes the 
parties to the agency action and persons that can meet the requirements 
to intervene in the proceedings.45  If an agency makes a decision through 
informal adjudication, then even fewer persons are likely to be involved 
since fewer people are likely to be aware that the agency is engaged in 
the adjudication.46  Finally, with many nonlegislative rules, the only 
people outside the agency who will be involved in the decision-making 
process will be those contacted by the agency. 47 
                                                          
 39. See 5 U.S.C. § 556. 
 40. See 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 
§ 7.9 (4th ed. 2002) (noting that executive influence over adjudication proceeding implicates Due 
Process Clause concerns). 
 41. See 5 U.S.C. § 555(e).  Informal adjudication requires that the agency simply provide 
prompt notice and a brief statement of the grounds for denial whenever the agency denies a “written 
application, petition, or other request of an interested person made in connection with any agency 
proceeding.”  Id. 
 42. Id. § 553(b); see also Johnson, supra note 3, at 699; Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory 
Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 406 (2007).  Agencies 
must publish and make available some, but not all, nonlegislative rules.  5 U.S.C. § 552(a). 
 43. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (providing that review is 
not required for rules issued under formal rulemaking provisions, rules that pertain to military and 
foreign affairs, and rules that are limited to agency organization, management, or personnel matters); 
see also Magill, supra note 5, at 1393 (noting that although “[i]ndependent agencies participate in 
the government-wide planning process, [they] are not required to submit their significant regulatory 
actions for review and approval”). 
 44. 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
 45. Magill, supra note 5, at 1391; Seidenfeld, supra note 13, at 337–38. 
 46. See Seidenfeld, supra note 13, at 339. 
 47. See Mendelson, supra note 42, at 425 (noting some agencies’ practice of soliciting 
comment but stating that they are generally not required to do so). 
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The legal effect of the various tools can greatly influence an 
agency’s choice of policymaking tool.  Legislative rules have the force 
and effect of law.48  When an agency enforces a legislative rule on a 
case-by-case basis, it does not have to independently justify the basis for 
the rule.49  Adjudication technically binds only the parties to the 
proceeding,50 but the order may set a precedent that encourages similarly 
situated persons to comply with the order in the future.51  Finally, 
nonlegislative rules do not bind the agency, the regulated community, or 
the public.52  They do not have any independent legal force.  If an agency 
applies the policy articulated in a nonlegislative rule on a case-by-case 
basis in adjudication, then the agency must justify the rationale behind 
the policy as applied to the facts of the case in a rational manner.53  The 
agency cannot simply rely on the rule as if it were a legislative rule.54  
The agency must support the policy as if the nonlegislative rule had 
never been issued.55  Although nonlegislative rules are not legally 
binding, they may be binding as a practical matter for entities that are 
unwilling to (1) incur the cost or potential harm to the relationship with 
an agency by challenging rules before they are enforced or (2) run the 
risk of paying penalties and suffering negative public perception if they 
wait and mount an unsuccessful challenge to the rules when they are 
enforced.56 
The final important difference between the various policymaking 
tools available to agencies is the degree of deference that courts accord to 
decisions made using those tools.  When an agency interprets a statute 
                                                          
 48. See Magill, supra note 5, at 1394 (proffering that a valid legislative rule operates like a 
statute). 
 49. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 40, § 6.4. 
 50. Magill, supra note 5, at 1394. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id.; Mendelson, supra note 42, at 400–01, 406–07.  Professor Elizabeth Magill notes, 
however, that like a policy adopted through adjudication, a policy articulated in a nonlegislative rule 
and upheld in an adjudication may set a precedent that encourages future compliance by similarly 
situated persons.  Magill, supra note 5, at 1394.  Professor John Manning has argued that one type of 
nonlegislative rule—interpretative rules—can be binding.  See Manning, supra note 7, at 920–23.  It 
is the statute or regulation interpreted by the rule, rather than the interpretative rule, that is binding. 
 53. See Mendelson, supra note 42, at 407, 412. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Manning, supra note 7, at 931.  The agency “must be able to justify its decision by 
reference to norms found elsewhere—either in the statute, an antecedent legislative rule, or 
adjudicative precedents interpreting those sources of authority.”  Id. (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). 
 56. Mendelson, supra note 42, at 400, 407 (stating that agency “guidance documents often have 
rule-like effects on regulated entities”); see also infra notes 150, 182 and accompanying text. 
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through a legislative rule, courts review the agency’s interpretation under 
a deferential standard established by the Supreme Court in Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.57  The Chevron 
test requires that a court first ask “whether Congress has directly spoken 
to the precise question at issue.”58  If Congress clearly expressed its 
intent, then both the agency and the court are bound by it.59  Conversely, 
if a court determines that Congress has been silent or ambiguous 
regarding the proper interpretation of a statute, then the court must ask 
“whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute.”60  The Chevron test likely also applies to decisions that 
agencies make through formal adjudication.  In United States v. Mead 
Corp., the Supreme Court held that Chevron applies “when it appears 
that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules 
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming 
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”61  
According to the Court, a “[d]elegation of such authority may be shown 
in a variety of ways, as by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication 
or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of 
comparable congressional intent.”62 
Although the Mead Court left open the possibility that Chevron 
deference might apply to nonlegislative rules,63 and although the Court 
suggested in Barnhart v. Walton that nonlegislative rules might qualify 
for Chevron deference in some cases,64 most lower courts have not 
accorded such deference to nonlegislative rules in practice.65  Instead, 
most courts accord nonlegislative rules a lesser degree of deference 
based on a variety of factors laid out by the Supreme Court in Skidmore 
v. Swift & Co.66  The Court held that the level of deference accorded an 
                                                          
 57. See 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984).  “[T]he court does not simply impose its own 
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.”  
Id. (footnote omitted) (citing ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 174–75 (1921)). 
 58. Id. at 842. 
 59. Id. at 842–43. 
 60. Id. at 843. 
 61. 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). 
 62. Id. at 227. 
 63. Id. at 227–28. 
 64. 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (“Mead pointed to instances in which the Court has applied 
Chevron deference to agency interpretations that did not emerge out of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.” (citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 230–31)). 
 65. See Funk, supra note 5, at 663 (“[C]ourts have traditionally bemoaned the difficulty of 
determining whether a given rule is a legislative rule, an interpretive rule, or a statement of policy.”). 
 66. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
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agency’s interpretation of a statute depends on “the thoroughness evident 
in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with 
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it 
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”67 
An agency’s choice of policymaking tool may depend on many other 
factors as well, including “how sure the agency is about what policy it 
wishes to adopt, how frequently the agency anticipates the question will 
come up, whether the issue is inherently entangled with other issues that 
can best be addressed comprehensively, and what other issues are 
currently pressing for the agency’s attention.”68 
An agency’s choice of policymaking tool has important 
repercussions for regulated entities as well as regulatory beneficiaries 
who participate in the agency’s regulatory scheme.  For instance, 
regulated entities may think that it is unfair for an agency to announce a 
new policy in an adjudication because the agency can impose the new 
policy retroactively on the target without advance notice and without 
soliciting broad input on development of the policy.69  Regulatory 
beneficiaries might also criticize the lack of public participation and 
could complain that the agencies’ decision would have a limited 
precedential effect.70  If an agency decides to announce a new policy 
through legislative rulemaking, on the other hand, then regulatory 
beneficiaries might criticize the delay involved in developing the policy 
in that manner, and regulated entities might prefer that the agency 
develop the policy incrementally through adjudication and retain more 
flexibility in responding to different factual scenarios.71 
While an agency’s choice of policymaking tool may be criticized by 
regulated entities and regulatory beneficiaries, courts rarely overturn an 
agency’s choice, although they may overturn the policy adopted by the 
agency using that tool.  Significantly, courts generally do not even 
require agencies to provide an explanation for their choice of rulemaking  
                                                          
 67. Id. 
 68. Elliott, supra note 9, at 1492. 
 69. See Magill, supra note 5, at 1396 (describing the consequences of a lack of public input). 
 70. See id. 
 71. See id. at 1396–97. 
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or adjudication.72  As Professor Elizabeth Magill notes, the judicial 
reaction to an agency’s choice of policymaking tool 
can be simply described: hands-off. . . . This judicial reaction is out of 
step with the rest of the law of judicial review of agency action.  Courts 
usually demand that agencies provide reasoned explanations for their 
discretionary choices, but there is no such reason-giving requirement 
when agencies select their preferred policymaking form.73 
The Supreme Court adopted this deferential approach decades ago in 
SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II).74  In discussing the SEC’s decision 
to interpret a statute through case-by-case adjudication instead of 
rulemaking, the Court indicated that an agency should rely on 
prospective rules wherever possible, “[b]ut any rigid requirement to that 
effect would make the administrative process inflexible and incapable of 
dealing with many of the specialized problems which arise.”75  The Court 
suggested that there were many situations where an agency should have 
the ability to develop policy on a case-by-case basis, including situations 
where unexpected problems arise, where the agency does not have 
sufficient experience to generate a general rule, or where the problem 
addressed was so specialized or varying that a general approach is not 
justified.76  Nevertheless, the Court ultimately held that “the choice made 
between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is 
one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative 
agency.”77  Even though the Chenery II Court suggested that adjudication 
might be a better approach for policymaking in certain circumstances, 
subsequent cases have not required agencies to use adjudication or 
imposed other limits on agencies’ discretion in choosing an appropriate 
policymaking tool.78 
                                                          
 72. Id. at 1385.  Professor Magill notes, however, that there are exceptions that limit an 
agency’s discretion.  As she stresses, Congress may require an agency to use a specific tool to make 
a decision, an agency may limit its discretion in advance by announcing that it will use a specific 
tool to make certain types of decisions, or constitutional due process requirements may require an 
agency to use a specific tool.  Id. at 1409–10. 
 73. Id. at 1385.  Professor Magill notes that an agency can make that choice “for a good reason, 
a bad reason, or no detectable reason.”  Id. at 1415. 
 74. 332 U.S. 194 (1947). 
 75. Id. at 202. 
 76. Id. at 202–03. 
 77. Id. at 203 (citing CBS v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 421 (1942)). 
 78. Magill, supra note 5, at 1408 (citing NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 292–94 
(1974)). 
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In NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., the Court recognized that an 
agency’s choice can be reviewed for “abuse of discretion,”79 but lower 
courts have been reluctant to do so.80  In fact, courts have generally only 
overturned an agency’s choice when the agency used adjudication to 
overturn a prior rule and the retroactive application of the new policy 
would cause significant hardship.81 
B. Nonlegislative Rules 
While courts uniformly apply the Chenery II approach when an 
agency chooses adjudication over rulemaking and vice versa, courts have 
been more willing to interfere when an agency decides to implement a 
policy through nonlegislative, rather than legislative, rulemaking.82  
Nonlegislative rules—sometimes referred to more generally as guidance 
documents—include “general statements of policy and interpretive 
rules.”83  General statements of policy describe “how an agency intends 
to exercise discretion that it is given to implement the statutes and 
regulations it administers,”84 while interpretive rules explain an agency’s 
                                                          
 79. 416 U.S. at 294. 
 80. See Magill, supra note 5, at 1408 (citing the limited circumstances when lower courts have 
“invalidated an agency’s reliance on adjudication instead of rulemaking”). 
 81. Id. 
 82. As noted below, courts do not ignore Chenery II in this context and invalidate an agency’s 
choice of nonlegislative rulemaking over legislative rulemaking, and they do not require agencies to 
explain their choice of nonlegislative rulemaking.  Instead, courts find that nonlegislative rules 
adopted by agencies are, in fact, legislative rules, and courts invalidate the rules on the ground that 
the agency failed to use the procedures required for legislative rulemaking.  See Magill, supra note 
5, at 1441 (noting courts’ concern with inappropriate reliance on guidance documents); see also 
infra notes 103, 113–19 and accompanying text. 
 83. Mendelson, supra note 42, at 398 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2006)).  Guidance 
documents issued by agencies vary greatly in the level of formality and can include manuals for 
agency staff, letter rulings, advice provided in phone conversations, circulars, and press releases.  
See William Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321, 1322–23 (2001) 
(providing examples of agency pronouncements); Magill, supra note 5, at 1391 (citing the wide 
range of agency instruments considered guidance documents); Manning, supra note 7, at 893 (listing 
types of informal policymaking issuances) (citing Richard J. Pierce, Rulemaking and the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 32 TULSA L.J. 185, 185 (1996)).  There is some debate about whether 
there is, or should be, a distinction between interpretive rules and general statements of policy, but 
courts have occasionally distinguished between them and developed different tests for distinguishing 
each from legislative rules.  See Funk, supra, at 1324 (noting that not all commentators agree that 
there is a distinction between these types of rules but that the courts have distinguished them).  
General statements of policy and interpretive rules, like legislative rules, are “rules” under the APA, 
which defines a “rule” as “an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect 
designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.”  5 U.S.C. § 551(4). 
 84. Seidenfeld, supra note 13, at 346. 
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interpretation of a statute or regulation.85  Over the last few decades, 
agencies have issued significantly more nonlegislative rules than 
legislative rules.86  For instance, the Food and Drug Administration 
issued about twice as many guidance documents as rules between 2001 
and 2003;87 between 1996 and 1999, the EPA issued over two thousand 
guidance documents, compared to one hundred “significant” legislative 
rules.88 
Many reasons underlie the trend toward nonlegislative rulemaking.  
General consensus indicates that the notice-and-comment rulemaking 
process has become ossified over the last few decades as Congress,89 
courts,90 and the executive branch91 have imposed substantial new 
procedural requirements on the notice-and-comment process.92  The 
process for adopting nonlegislative rules is quicker and less expensive 
than legislative rulemaking93 and frees agency resources to address other 
                                                          
 85. See id. 
 86. See Magill, supra note 5, at 1385 (noting the shift that occurred as administrative agencies 
began pursuing mandates by promulgating legislative rules). 
 87. Erica Seiguer & John J. Smith, Perception and Process at the Food and Drug 
Administration: Obligations and Trade-Offs in Rules and Guidances, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 17, 25–
26 (2005). 
 88. Mendelson, supra note 42, at 399. 
 89. See, e.g., 44 U.S.C. § 3507 (2006) (requiring submission of information-collection requests 
for certain rules under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995); 2 U.S.C. § 1532(a) (2006) (requiring 
analyses of alternatives for certain rules under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995); 5 
U.S.C. § 603 (2006) (requiring an initial flexibility analysis for certain rules under the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act). 
 90. Under the current interpretation of the APA provision that requires an agency to provide “a 
concise general statement of the basis and purpose” of its final rule, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c), the agency 
must address and rationally respond to the public comments relating to the proposed rule.  See Lloyd 
Noland Hosp. & Clinic v. Heckler, 762 F.2d 1561, 1566–67 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting that the general 
statement “should fully explain the factual and legal basis for the rule” (citing S. REP. NO. 752, at 14 
(1946))); United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252–53 (2d Cir. 1977) (requiring 
agencies to respond to “vital questions” raised by comments).  As a result, before an agency issues a 
final rule, it typically invests substantial time and resources to identify and formulate cogent 
responses to public comments. 
 91. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3822 (Jan. 18, 2011) (improving 
regulation and regulatory review and requiring agencies to seek the views of those who are likely to 
be affected); Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,256 (Aug. 4, 1999) (requiring 
federalism-impacts analysis when formulating and implementing policies); Exec. Order No. 12,630, 
53 Fed. Reg. 8859, 8862 (Mar. 18, 1988) (requiring takings analyses for proposed regulatory 
actions). 
 92. Johnson, supra note 3, at 700–01. 
 93. Seidenfeld, supra note 13, at 340–41; see also Johnson, supra note 3, at 701 (“[T]he process 
for adopting nonlegislative rules is significantly quicker and less expensive than the . . . rulemaking 
process . . . .”); Magill, supra note 5, at 1392 (“[G]uidance documents permit the agency to develop 
policy relatively cheaply.”); Mendelson, supra note 42, at 408 (“[I]ssuing a guidance is relatively 
cheap compared with the costs of notice-and-comment rulemaking.” (citing OFFICE OF MGMT. & 
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important priorities.94  In addition, nonlegislative rules provide agencies 
with the flexibility to change and refine their policies and interpretations 
more quickly.95  Nonlegislative rules are also subject to less presidential 
and congressional oversight than legislative rules.96 
“While agencies could choose to make policies and interpretations 
through adjudication, adoption of nonlegislative rules, like the adoption 
of legislative rules, enables agencies to give advance notice to the 
regulated community and regulatory beneficiaries about the agencies’ 
interpretations and policies.”97  Since guidance documents apply 
prospectively, using them protects reliance interests better than 
adjudication.98  The use of nonlegislative rules “also enables agencies to 
promote consistent decisionmaking and application of the law by their 
employees.”99 
Although agencies that adopt policies through nonlegislative 
rulemaking sacrifice the binding nature, increased deference,100 
transparency,101 and opportunity to obtain more information from a 
                                                                                                                       
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DRAFT 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND 
BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 6 (2005))).  Recent notice-and-comment rulemaking by the 
FCC, the EPA, and the Forest Service has spawned hundreds of thousands of comments.  Cary 
Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943, 954 
(2006). 
 94. Franklin, supra note 5, at 304. 
 95. Johnson, supra note 3, at 701; see also Manning, supra note 7, at 914 (noting that 
nonlegislative documents are a “flexib[le]” option for agencies to change their policies); Mendelson, 
supra note 42, at 408–10 (“The agency also retains the ability to change the guidance inexpensively 
and quickly.”); Seidenfeld, supra note 13, at 340 (“Notice-and-comment procedures are . . . an 
inefficient means of tweaking policy or interpretations already adopted by legislative rule.”). 
 96. Johnson, supra note 3, at 701–02; see also Mendelson, supra note 42, at 410 (“Guidance 
documents receive very limited review from Congress and the White House.”). 
 97. Johnson, supra note 3, at 702; see also Franklin, supra note 5, at 303–04 (stating that 
nonlegislative rules “provide[] relatively swift and accurate notice to the public of how the agency 
interprets the statutes or rules that it administers”); Funk, supra note 83, at 1332 (noting that these 
documents provide guidance as to the agencies’ intentions to regulated entities); Manning, supra 
note 7, at 914–15 (“[N]onlegislative rules potentially allow agencies . . . to give the public valuable 
notice of anticipated policies.”); Mendelson, supra note 42, at 402 (noting that these documents are 
better than the alternative of no notice of the agency’s implementation or enforcement approaches). 
 98. Seidenfeld, supra note 13, at 341. 
 99. Johnson, supra note 3, at 702; see also Franklin, supra note 5, at 304 (“[N]onlegislative 
rulemaking allows agency heads to inform lower-level employees promptly about changes in agency 
policy.”); Manning, supra note 7, at 914–15 (“[N]onlegislative rules potentially allow agencies to 
supply often far-flung staffs with needed direction . . . .”); Mendelson, supra note 42, at 402 (“[T]he 
documents help agencies guide the conduct of lower-level employees.”). 
 100. Manning, supra note 7, at 937–40; see supra notes 48–62 and accompanying text. 
 101. The use of guidance documents to articulate policies and interpretations may impair the 
public’s knowledge of and compliance with the law.  Johnson, supra note 3, at 703. 
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broader audience available through legislative rulemaking,102 the 
advantages of nonlegislative rulemaking outlined above frequently 
exceed those of legislative rulemaking. 
C. Distinguishing Legislative Rules From Nonlegislative Rules  
As agencies have adopted more policies and interpretations through 
nonlegislative rulemaking, regulated entities and regulatory beneficiaries 
have challenged those policy decisions, frequently before agencies have 
applied the policies to them.  In most cases, the challengers argue that the 
agencies’ policies are, in fact, legislative rules that the court should 
invalidate because the agencies did not use the notice-and-comment 
procedures as required for legislative rulemaking.103  Increasingly, 
courts, led by the D.C. Circuit, have developed tests to determine 
whether a purported nonlegislative rule is, in fact, a legislative rule and, 
thus, subject to invalidation as procedurally invalid.104 
Prior to 1978, some courts used a “substantial impact” test to 
distinguish between legislative and nonlegislative rules, finding that a 
rule was a legislative rule if it had a substantial impact on the regulated 
community.105  That test, however, received strong criticism and 
succumbed to the “legally binding effect” or “force of law” test.106  The 
D.C. Circuit has primarily developed the new test, which frames the 
analysis differently depending on whether the challenged nonlegislative 
rule is a general statement of policy or an interpretive rule. 
For general statements of policy, the court focuses on whether the 
agency’s policy has a binding legal effect.107  The court looks at several 
factors, including whether the agency intended to promulgate a binding 
rule,108 whether the agency used mandatory language in the policy,109 
                                                          
 102. See Mendelson, supra note 42, at 409 (stating that “[t]he agency will not . . . receive useful 
information from previously unknown sources”). 
 103. See Funk, supra note 5, at 660; Magill, supra note 5, at 1412.  Occasionally, when they 
favor a nonlegislative rule adopted by an agency that the agency has declined to enforce, challengers 
will forego procedural challenges and argue that nonlegislative rules are legislative rules which the 
agency must apply.  See Funk, supra note 5, at 661. 
 104. See infra notes 107–10, 113–15; see also Hoctor v. USDA, 82 F.3d 165, 170–72 (7th Cir. 
1996). 
 105. See Cent. Tex. Tel. Coop., Inc. v. FCC, 402 F.3d 205, 214 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (describing past 
use of this now-disfavored text); Funk, supra note 83, at 1325–26. 
 106. See Funk, supra note 5, at 662; Johnson, supra note 3, at 705. 
 107. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974); 
Franklin, supra note 5, at 288. 
 108. See U.S. Tel. Ass’n v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
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whether the agency has, in practice, applied the policy in a mandatory 
fashion,110 whether the agency characterized its policy as discretionary,111 
and whether the agency published the policy in the Federal Register or 
Code of Federal Regulations.112 
For interpretive rules, the court focuses on whether the rule merely 
interprets or affirms a preexisting obligation or right from a statute or 
regulation or, on the other hand, creates a new binding obligation or 
right.113  In assessing the nature of the rule, the court looks at whether the 
agency cites specific statutory or regulatory authority for the rule,114 
whether the agency supports the rule with reference to the “language, 
purpose, and legislative history” of the provision on which it is based,115 
whether there is an adequate basis in a statute or regulation for the 
agency’s rule,116 whether the agency characterizes its actions as creating 
an interpretive rule,117 and whether the agency exercises independent 
judgment in making policy.118  To the extent that the agency engages in 
independent policymaking, the court will more likely find that the rule is 
a legislative rule.119 
Courts, including the D.C. Circuit, have labeled these tests as 
“‘fuzzy,’ ‘tenuous,’ ‘blurred,’ ‘baffling,’ and ‘enshrouded in 
considerable smog.’”120  Regarding interpretive rules, for instance, the 
D.C. Circuit has held that an interpretive rule can “resolve . . . 
                                                                                                                       
 109. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  As one 
commentator observed, a court will be more likely to invalidate a would-be policy statement if it 
uses “mandatory, definitive language.”  Manning, supra note 7, at 918 (quoting Cmty. Nutrition Inst. 
v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 110. See U.S. Tel. Ass’n, 28 F.3d at 1235 (concluding that the agency’s consistent practice 
revealed an intention for the rule to be binding). 
 111. See Funk, supra note 5, at 662. 
 112. See id. at 662–63. 
 113. See Orengo Caraballo v. Reich, 11 F.3d 186, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Gen. Motors Corp. v. 
Ruckleshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc). 
 114. See United Tech. Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 719–20 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Manning, supra 
note 7, at 920. 
 115. See Gen. Motors Corp., 742 F.2d at 1565; Manning, supra note 7, at 920. 
 116. See Funk, supra note 83, at 1327–28. 
 117. Id. at 1330.  Courts will give substantial weight to an agency’s characterization of a rule as 
interpretive at the time of issuance.  Id. 
 118. See id. at 1328–29; Manning, supra note 7, at 920. 
 119. See Manning, supra note 7, at 920. 
 120. Richard J. Pierce Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 547, 547–48 (2000) (quoting Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 
1987); Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Chrisholm 
v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
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ambiguities in the statute.”121  Indeed, interpretive rules would have 
limited usefulness if agencies could only use them to parrot statutory or 
regulatory language.  Under the D.C. Circuit’s test, however, it is then 
difficult to determine when an agency resolves ambiguities as opposed to 
creates new rights, thus exercising independent policy judgment.122  
Similarly, regarding general statements of policy, it is frequently difficult 
to determine whether a policy has a binding legal effect “in the absence 
of a well-developed record of enforcement.”123 
Academics too have strongly criticized the test adopted by the D.C. 
Circuit.124  Several academics have proposed a straightforward 
alternative approach that has been referred to as “the notice-and-
comment test”125 and “ex post monitoring” of nonlegislative rules,126 
among other names.  As Professor William Funk describes the test, “any 
rule not issued after notice and comment is an interpretive rule or 
statement of policy, unless it qualifies as a rule exempt from notice and 
comment on some other basis.”127  Agencies can make decisions 
consistent with the policies and interpretations embodied in the rule even 
though the agencies did not adopt the rule as a legislative rule.128  
Because the rule is nonlegislative, however, the agency must justify the 
reasoning behind the rule when the agency applies it in a concrete, 
factual context, and the agency cannot simply rely on the rule as the basis 
for its decision.129  If the agency failed to provide an independent rational 
basis for its decision when it applied the rule, then a reviewing court 
should invalidate the agency’s decision at that time because the agency 
has not adequately articulated a rational basis for its decision and not 
because the agency relied on a procedurally invalid legislative rule.130  If, 
on the other hand, the agency articulated a rational basis for its decision 
that is consistent with the nonlegislative rule, the a reviewing court 
                                                          
 121. Health Ins. Ass’n of Am. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see Manning, supra 
note 7, at 921–22. 
 122. See Manning, supra note 7, at 923–25.  Manning believes that the D.C. Circuit’s precedent 
“push[es] policymaking upward into more formal, pluralistic, and accountable processes,” 
specifically, notice-and-comment rulemaking.  Id. at 916. 
 123. See Franklin, supra note 5, at 288. 
 124. See, e.g., Funk, supra note 5, at 663; Seidenfeld, supra note 13, at 352–55. 
 125. Funk, supra note 5, at 663. 
 126. Seidenfeld, supra note 13, at 352–55. 
 127. Funk, supra note 5, at 663. 
 128. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 707. 
 129. Id. (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38–39 (D.C. Cir. 
1974)). 
 130. See Elliott, supra note 9, at 1491; Johnson, supra note 3, at 707–08. 
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should uphold the agency’s decision regardless of the procedures used to 
adopt the rule.  Funk was neither the first nor the last to suggest his 
“simple test.”  Professor E. Donald Elliott was an early proponent of the 
test,131 the inspiration for which can be traced back to a dissenting 
opinion by then-D.C. Circuit Judge Kenneth Starr in 1987.132  Professors 
John Manning,133 Jacob Gersen,134 and Peter Strauss135 have proposed 
variations of the test, and Franklin recently criticized the test, which he 
re-branded as the “short cut.”136 
III. PROFESSOR FRANKLIN’S CRITIQUE OF THE SHORT CUT 
Like most commentators, Franklin agrees that the tests used to 
distinguish legislative rules from nonlegislative rules are flawed and 
difficult to apply.137  He further concedes that the short cut is easier to 
apply138 but notes that courts have been reluctant to adopt the 
approach.139  Ultimately, Franklin argues that the status quo is preferable 
to the short cut.140 
Franklin stresses that courts, despite ample opportunity, have 
consistently rejected the short cut in favor of perpetuating the “force of 
law” and similar tests.141  He also argues that courts have not implicitly 
                                                          
 131. Elliott, supra note 9, at 1490.  Elliott criticized courts for trying to determine whether an 
agency intended to bind the public with its actions and argued that “it is a fundamental tenet of 
administrative law, crucial to maintaining the proper balance between courts and agencies, that an 
agency’s action is what it says it is.”  Id. 
 132. Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part), cited in Franklin, supra note 5, at 291–92. 
 133. Manning, supra note 7, at 918, 929–30.  Professor Manning suggests that courts should 
refrain from attempting to distinguish legislative rules from nonlegislative rules because there are no 
judicially manageable standards to use to make the distinction.  Id. at 929.  This would be consistent, 
he argues, with the hands-off approach that courts have taken in administering the nondelegation 
doctrine and in applying Chenery II, both of which lack judicially manageable standards.  Id.  Like 
others, Professor Manning stresses that courts will assign different effects to rules when agencies 
apply them depending on whether the agencies used notice-and-comment rulemaking.  Id. at 930–31. 
 134. See Gersen, supra note 7, at 1719–21. 
 135. See Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1467–68 (1992). 
 136. See Franklin, supra note 5, at 278–80. 
 137. Id. at 278–79. 
 138. Id. at 279. 
 139. Id. at 294. 
 140. See id. 
 141. Id. at 294–98.  The cases that he cites as examples where a court could have adopted the 
short cut, but refused to do so, include Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2009); Catawba 
County v. EPA, 571 F.3d 20 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Croplife America v. EPA, 329 F.3d 876 
(D.C. Cir. 2003); Sprint Corp. v. FCC, 315 F.3d 369 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Air Transport Ass’n of 
America, Inc. v. FAA, 291 F.3d 49 (D.C. Cir. 2002); General Electric Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377 
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adopted the short cut.142  If courts routinely rejected pre-enforcement 
challenges to nonlegislative rules as procedurally invalid legislative 
rules, he argues, then one might conclude that courts have moved toward 
replacing the current tests with the short cut.143  Unlike many other 
commentators,144 however, Franklin asserts that courts generally review 
pre-enforcement challenges to nonlegislative rules, rather than dismiss 
them based on the doctrines of ripeness or finality.145  Consequently, he 
asserts that courts have not implicitly adopted the short cut by 
postponing review of nonlegislative rules until agencies enforce them in 
concrete factual settings. 
Franklin suggests that courts should continue to apply existing tests 
to distinguish legislative from nonlegislative rules.146  He does not 
defend all aspects of the current law; but he argues that the current tests’ 
vagueness provides flexibility for courts “to tailor the requirement of 
notice and comment to circumstances in which factors such as technical 
complexity or significant effects on regulatory beneficiaries make public 
input more valuable . . . while allowing agencies to dispense with notice 
and comment when such factors are absent.”147 
                                                                                                                       
(D.C. Cir. 2002); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 142. See Franklin, supra note 5, at 299–302. 
 143. Id. at 300.  As he notes, if courts were doing that, “then one of the essential functions of the 
short cut—preserving agencies’ methodological discretion—[would] be[] served.”  Id.  Similarly, he 
argues that if the tests used to limit pre-enforcement review were “emphatic and predictable,” the 
other essential purpose of the short cut—reducing litigation costs—would be served as well.  Id. 
 144. See infra notes 155–65, 218–22 and accompanying text. 
 145. See Franklin, supra note 5, at 300–02.  Id.  He acknowledges that in “some cases [courts] 
have held that the question of whether a rule is legislative or nonlegislative is unripe for review at 
the pre-enforcement stage,” but he argues that: 
Most of those cases, however, appear to involve claims by an agency that its rule is 
exempt from notice and comment as a general statement of policy.  The finding of 
unripeness in such cases arises not from the logic of the short cut but from the notion that 
a rule’s true nature as a general statement of policy cannot be ascertained until a series of 
enforcement actions has revealed whether the position expressed in the rule was tentative 
or binding on the agency. 
Id. at 300.  He also acknowledges that some courts have held that nonlegislative rules do not 
constitute “final agency action” subject to judicial review, but he stresses that “even those courts . . . 
have not come close to embracing the short cut.”  Id. at 301–02. 
 146. Id. at 324–26. 
 147. Id. at 325.  Franklin argues that the current reliance on the “force of law” test and similar 
tests is analogous to “the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges in constitutional 
adjudication,” with the current tests resembling facial review and the short cut resembling as-applied 
review.  Id.  Franklin argues that while courts, in the constitutional context, declare a preference for 
as-applied review, they frequently engage in facial review “because the as-applied model in its 
strongest form has proven unduly rigid.”  Id. at 325.  In making that claim, Franklin ignores the fact 
that courts prefer as-applied review in the constitutional context as he argues for a preference for 
facial review in the context of distinguishing between legislative and nonlegislative rules. 
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More importantly, Franklin argues that the short cut is significantly 
flawed because it reduces public and judicial oversight over agencies by 
allowing agencies to avoid notice-and-comment rulemaking.148  Franklin 
and other critics point out that the public has very few opportunities for 
participation when agencies adopt policies or interpretations through 
nonlegislative rules.149  Although agencies may occasionally consult with 
regulated entities when developing nonlegislative rules, they rarely 
consult with regulatory beneficiaries and are not required to consult with 
anyone.150 
Supporters of the short cut argue that there is opportunity for public 
participation when the rule is applied and subsequently challenged in 
court.  Franklin counters that such participation comes too late.151  
Franklin claims that the lack of early opportunities to participate reduces 
the likelihood that the agency will develop a sufficient record to facilitate 
meaningful judicial review, if judicial review is available at all.152  Other 
critics also stress that a much smaller group of persons will participate in 
review of the rule during the challenge in court than would participate 
during notice-and-comment rulemaking.153 
                                                          
 148. Id. at 324; see also Gersen, supra note 7, at 1720 (discussing how agencies might avoid 
notice and comment); Johnson, supra note 3, at 702–03 (explaining that reliance on nonlegislative 
rules reduces public opportunity to help develop agency policies or challenge them in court). 
 149. See Franklin, supra note 5, at 280, 304–05 (discussing the costs of nonlegislative rules).  
Agencies may seek out input “to gather new information or identify significant problems with [a] 
policy,” to “flush out controversy or political opposition,” or to “claim greater legitimacy for their 
[proposed] polic[y].”  Mendelson, supra note 42, at 425. 
 150. See Mendelson, supra note 42, at 424–28; Seidenfeld, supra note 13, at 341–43 (discussing 
participation in formulating guidance documents by non-agency entities).  As Professor Nina 
Mendelson notes, to the extent that agencies solicit input on nonlegislative rules, they are likely to 
seek out regulated entities, rather than regulatory beneficiaries, because agencies are more likely to 
know the identities of the regulated entities, “may have a greater interest in maintaining a good long-
term relationship with regulated entities because [they] must constantly deal with them” and want 
them to comply with the law, and because regulated entities are likely to have valuable information 
regarding the cost and feasibility of the agency’s proposed rules.  Mendelson, supra note 42, at 429–
30.  Regulatory beneficiaries are less likely to have opportunities to provide input to agencies in 
developing nonlegislative rules because “learning about the existence of guidances before they are 
finalized can be difficult and expensive,” regulatory beneficiaries may be diffuse and poorly 
organized, and regulatory beneficiaries “may lack the political clout that might otherwise motivate 
an agency to seek their approval.”  Id. at 430.  As regulatory beneficiaries are excluded from the 
decision-making process, they are “less likely to view agency choices as legitimate.”  Id. at 420. 
 151. Franklin, supra note 5, at 316–18 (discussing the different levels of public participation 
between notice and comment and judicial review as well as differences in judicial review of rules 
developed with notice and comment and those developed without); see Seidenfeld, supra note 13, at 
342–43 (“[O]nce an agency has committed to guidance, the likelihood of participation altering its 
assessment of whether the guidance is worthwhile is small.”). 
 152. Franklin, supra note 5, at 316–18. 
 153. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 42, at 450–52 (discussing the difficulties and costs of filing 
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Public participation is vital to the development of an agency’s policies 
because (1) it provides oversight of agency action and prevents 
agencies from being captured by the regulated community or other 
special interest groups; (2) it provides the agency with important 
information about the impacts of proposed decisions that enable the 
agency to administer the law in a rational, defensible manner; and (3) it 
instills a sense of legitimacy in the public regarding the agency’s 
decisions.154 
Regarding judicial review, critics of the short cut frequently assert 
that it eliminates or reduces opportunities for judicial review of an 
agency’s policy decisions.  Nonlegislative rules might avoid judicial 
review either because the rules are not “final agency action” or the 
challenges are unripe.155  Under the APA, a court may review “final 
agency action.”156  The Supreme Court has held that an agency action is 
final if it is “the ‘consummation’ of the agency’s decision-making 
process”157 and is an “action . . . by which ‘rights or obligations have 
been determined,’ or from which ‘legal consequences will flow.’”158  The 
Court has limited the second part to cases where agency action “is 
sufficiently direct and immediate,’ and has ‘a direct effect on . . . day-to-
day business.”159  Nonlegislative rules that issue from lower-level agency 
                                                                                                                       
suit to obtain review of agency policies). 
 154. Johnson, supra note 3, at 702–03 (footnote omitted). 
 155. Mendelson, supra note 42, at 420–21.  Mendelson has argued that regulatory beneficiaries 
are likely to have much less access to judicial review of agencies’ nonlegislative rules than regulated 
entities.  See id. at 421–24.  Mendelson notes that while regulated entities can challenge 
nonlegislative rules when the agency enforces them, regulatory beneficiaries cannot because the 
agency will not enforce the rules against them.  Id. at 421.  She also argues that procedural rules 
regarding intervention may preclude or limit the ability of regulatory beneficiaries to participate in 
lawsuits where an agency enforced the nonlegislative rule against regulated entities.  Id. at 422–24.  
Further, she points out that regulatory beneficiaries may not even be aware of enforcement actions 
involving the nonlegislative rule.  Id. at 424. 
 While recognizing that nonlegislative rules may limit the availability of review for regulatory 
beneficiaries, Professor Funk argues that the concepts of ripeness and finality provide enough 
flexibility to grant access to judicial review in some circumstances when it would not be available 
for regulated entities.  See Funk, supra note 83, at 1340.  Since regulatory beneficiaries could not 
challenge a nonlegislative rule in an enforcement action, Funk reasons that “[t]he issue will never 
become more ripe” for review from the perspective of a regulatory beneficiary that has been 
deprived of benefits.  Id. 
 156. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006). 
 157. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman 
S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948)). 
 158. Id. at 178 (quoting Marine Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 
71 (1970)). 
 159. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796–97 (1992) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted); William 
Funk, Legislating for Nonlegislative Rules, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1023, 1030 (2004). 
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officials or leave agency officials with significant discretion may not 
constitute the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process.160  
Similarly, since nonlegislative rules are generally not binding, courts 
might determine that the rules will not have a direct effect on 
challengers.161 
Nonlegislative rules might also avoid judicial review when courts 
dismiss challenges based on ripeness.  To determine ripeness, the 
Supreme Court has held that courts should examine the fitness of the 
issue for resolution and the hardship on the parties of withholding 
review.162  When it is not clear how an agency will apply a nonlegislative 
rule on a case-by-case basis, courts may conclude that the challenge to 
the rule is not fit for review.163  Similarly, to the extent that a 
nonlegislative rule is not binding, courts may conclude that there is not 
sufficient hardship on the challenger to permit review.164  In either case, 
courts may dismiss the challenges to nonlegislative rules as unripe.165  
Although Franklin argues that most challenges to nonlegislative rules are 
reviewable,166 he asserts that a few important types of nonlegislative 
                                                          
 160. See Funk, supra note 83, at 1335–36 (stating that a letter sent by a person lacking “power to 
render definitive agency interpretations” may not be an agency action); Mendelson, supra note 42, at 
411 (noting that a staff-level document might not qualify as “final agency action”). 
 161. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 712–13 (explaining that nonlegislative rules often are not 
reviewable because they do not have a direct effect and thus are not “final”).  Nevertheless, some 
nonlegislative rules can have direct, practical effects on persons even though the rules are not 
binding.  See Funk, supra note 83, at 1338 (discussing the practical effects of an agency’s 
nonbinding opinion letter). 
 162. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 148–49. 
 163. See Funk, supra note 83, at 1339 (citing Fla. Power & Light Co. v. EPA, 145 F.3d 1414 
(D.C. Cir. 1998)).  In Florida Power & Light Co., the court decided that an interpretation that lacked 
concrete application was unripe.  Id. 
 164. See id. at 1338–39 (discussing instances where courts have concluded that interpretive, 
nonbinding rules did not impose duties or burdens on a challenger and, thus, did not impose hardship 
on the challenger). 
 165. Johnson, supra note 3, at 713 (“[T]o the extent that nonlegislative rules are nonbinding and 
may be tentative, pre-enforcement challenges to those rules are often dismissed as unripe.” (citing 
ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1577 (D.C. Cir. 1987))). 
 166. See Franklin, supra note 5, at 301.  Franklin asserts that “the prevailing view is that pre-
enforcement . . . challenges are indeed ripe for review.”  Id. (citing Cohen v. United States, 578 F.3d 
1 (D.C. Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc granted in part, opinion vacated in part, 599 F.3d 652 (D.C. Cir. 
2010); Coal. for Common Sense in Gov’t Procurement v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 464 F.3d 1306, 
1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2006)) (arguing that most courts will subject nonlegislative rules to judicial 
review).  Further, he writes, “although some courts have held that nonlegislative rules do not 
constitute ‘final agency action[,]’ . . . this holding, as with ripeness, hardly applies across the board.”  
See id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006)). 
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rules may evade review.167  In those cases, the short cut reduces both 
public and judicial oversight of agency decision-making. 
Supporters of the short cut maintain that agencies will not routinely 
avoid notice-and-comment procedures if courts adopt the short cut 
because agencies must independently justify the policies and 
interpretations in nonlegislative rules when they apply them.168  Further, 
courts may accord nonlegislative rules less deference than legislative 
rules,169 especially in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in United 
States v. Mead Corp.170  Thus, even though the agency may avoid the 
public scrutiny of notice-and-comment rulemaking when adopting a 
nonlegislative rule, a court will subject the rule to enhanced scrutiny on 
review.171  Supporters of the short cut maintain that, in many cases, this 
trade off will not be worthwhile to agencies.172  Agencies will choose to 
adopt significant policies and interpretations through legislative 
rulemaking because the rules will have the force of law and receive 
Chevron deference.173  Ultimately, supporters maintain that the agency 
should have the choice of “paying now,” by adopting a policy or 
interpretation through notice-and-comment rulemaking, or “paying 
later,” by devoting more time and resources to defending the application 
of the policy or interpretation.174 
Franklin, however, disagrees, arguing that the short cut would 
encourage agencies to avoid notice-and-comment rulemaking even for 
significant policy decisions and interpretations.175  He maintains that 
agencies will avoid notice-and-comment rulemaking in some cases 
despite the nonbinding nature of nonlegislative rulemaking because some 
of the policies and interpretations that agencies adopt by nonlegislative 
rulemaking will never face a challenge in court, whereas they would if 
                                                          
 167. See infra notes 180–82 and accompanying text. 
 168. Franklin, supra note 5, at 280 (citing Gersen, supra note 7, at 1720–21). 
 169. Id. 
 170. 533 U.S. 218 (2001); see Franklin, supra note 5, at 280, 293–94 (explaining that Mead held 
that “nonlegislative rules are presumptively disqualified from deferential judicial review under the 
Chevron doctrine”); Gersen, supra note 7, at 1720–21 (asserting that Mead suggests that the degree 
of deference that a nonlegislative rule receives from a court depends on the agency’s procedure used 
to generate the rule). 
 171. Franklin, supra note 5, at 280. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See Elliott, supra note 9, at 1491.  Professor Elliott notes that agencies face the same 
dilemma as the consumers in the classic Fram oil filter television commercial who are told that “you 
can pay me now or pay me later.”  Id. 
 175. See Franklin, supra note 5, at 312–16. 
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the agency adopted them as legislative rules.176  In addition, he maintains 
that agencies will avoid notice-and-comment rulemaking—even though 
courts accord legislative rules with Chevron deference—because 
agencies can adopt policies and interpretations through adjudication or 
nonlegislative rulemaking and receive the same or nearly the same 
deference for their decisions in court.177  As a result, he maintains that 
the short cut reduces public and judicial oversight of agency decision-
making.178  Finally, Franklin argues that even in cases where a party may 
challenge an agency’s nonlegislative rule in court, the nature of the 
public and judicial oversight of agency decision-making at that stage 
differs significantly from the oversight in the notice-and-comment 
process and pre-enforcement review of legislative rules.179 
Regarding judicial review, Franklin notes that when an agency’s 
nonlegislative rule outlines conditions under which the agency will 
withhold enforcement actions, opponents will not be able to challenge 
the rule in an enforcement action because the agency will not bring an 
enforcement action under the rule.180  These deregulatory or 
nonenforcement policies frequently have a greater negative impact on 
regulatory beneficiaries than on regulated entities.181  Franklin also points 
out that many other nonlegislative rules are unlikely to be challenged if 
they cannot be challenged pre-enforcement.  Regulated entities may 
decide that the costs of challenging the rule in an enforcement action—
combined with potential penalties for noncompliance and damage to 
their relationship with the agency—exceed the benefits that may arise 
from successfully challenging the rule.182  Franklin argues that when an 
agency can “coerce compliance” or adopts policies to deregulate or limit 
enforcement, it succeeds in avoiding both public and judicial 
oversight.183 
Regarding alternatives to legislative rulemaking, Franklin argues that 
the short cut would allow agencies to routinely avoid legislative 
                                                          
 176. Id. at 308–11. 
 177. See id. at 312–16; infra text accompanying notes 184–93. 
 178. See Franklin, supra note 5, at 316. 
 179. See id. at 316–19; infra text accompanying notes 195–96. 
 180. See Franklin, supra note 5, at 308–09; see also Funk, supra note 5, at 667; Seidenfeld, 
supra note 13, at 344.  The nonlegislative rule may set minimum criteria that trigger enforcement, 
may outline safe harbors for compliance, or may articulate a general deregulatory policy or 
interpretation.  See Franklin, supra note 5, at 309. 
 181. See Franklin, supra note 5, at 309–11. 
 182. See id. at 311–12; see also Seidenfeld, supra note 13, at 343. 
 183. See Franklin, supra note 5, at 309. 
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rulemaking even for significant policy decisions because agencies can 
still receive substantial deference when they adopt policies and 
interpretations through adjudication and nonlegislative rulemaking.184  
First, under Chenery II, courts are reluctant to impede on agencies’ 
discretion to choose to implement policies and interpretations through 
adjudication, as opposed to legislative rulemaking.185  Since courts will 
accord Chevron deference to policies and interpretations adopted by 
agencies through formal adjudication, he argues, agencies may 
frequently choose to proceed through adjudication rather than legislative 
rulemaking.186 
Franklin also argues that, even after Mead, an agency may choose to 
adopt significant policies and interpretations as nonlegislative rules 
because courts will accord those rules Chevron deference.187  He stresses 
that Mead merely created a presumption that nonlegislative rules should 
receive less deference; further, in Barnhart v. Walton,188 the Supreme 
Court confirmed that nonlegislative rules may receive Chevron deference 
in some cases.189  If nonlegislative rules receive the same deference from 
courts, he reasons, then agencies trade off nothing by making policy 
through nonlegislative rules rather than legislative rules.190  Even under 
the Skidmore standard, Franklin argues that agencies trade off little 
because the Skidmore and Chevron standards are, in practice, almost 
identical.191  Finally, Franklin notes that when an agency interprets a 
                                                          
 184. See id. at 312. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 312–16.  Franklin concedes that there are disadvantages to agencies in proceeding 
through adjudication, since the decision adopted through adjudication will only bind the parties to 
the adjudication and the agency will have to justify future applications of the policy in future 
adjudications to the extent that the facts in the adjudications are distinguishable from the original 
adjudication.  Id. at 312–13.  Nevertheless, he suggests that those limitations are minor and will not 
generally discourage agencies from proceeding through adjudication instead of legislative 
rulemaking.  Id. 
 187. Id. at 320–22. 
 188. 535 U.S. 212 (2002). 
 189. See Franklin, supra note 5, at 320.  Franklin notes that in Mead, “the Court conceded that it 
had accorded Chevron deference to some nonlegislative rules in the past and suggested that it might 
do so again.”  Id. (footnote omitted) (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231 (2001)).  
Franklin continues by explaining that “in Barnhart, the Court went out of its way to reject the 
claimant’s argument that the agency’s interpretation was not entitled to deference because it had 
initially been issued without notice and comment.”  Id. 
 190. See id. at 320–23 (discussing Mead and myriad deference regimes). 
 191. Id. at 321–22.  Franklin argues that the Skidmore standard is particularly deferential “in 
technical contexts where courts are likely to view agencies as having a comparative advantage in 
expertise.”  Id. at 321.  He notes that “[a] recent study demonstrated that agencies prevailed in more 
than sixty percent of the cases in which the Skidmore standard was applied.”  Id. (citing Kristin E. 
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regulation, rather than a statute, through a nonlegislative rule, courts will 
accord the agency’s rule even greater deference than Chevron 
deference.192  Under Supreme Court precedent, courts will uphold an 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulation unless it is “plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”193  Based on the standards 
of review, Mead does not give agencies an incentive to choose legislative 
rulemaking over other policymaking tools.194 
Even if the short cut works as supporters claim, and agencies choose 
to adopt policies and interpretations as nonlegislative rules knowing that 
they will have to “pay later” by independently justifying their decisions 
before a court according them less deference, Franklin raises an 
additional criticism.  The short cut, he argues, would still reduce public 
and judicial oversight of agency decision-making because “the public 
scrutiny that comes with notice and comment and the judicial scrutiny 
that comes with post-enforcement review are fundamentally 
dissimilar.”195  He stresses that 
the mechanism of notice and comment was designed to ensure an 
opportunity for interested members of the public to participate in the 
process of agency policymaking by making comments, raising 
objections, and suggesting alternatives to proposed rules.  While post-
enforcement judicial review can mimic these features, it cannot fully 
recreate them because it occurs in the factual context of a particular 
enforcement action, before generalist judges, and at the behest of the 
regulated entity against whom that action has been taken . . . .  [E]ven 
with liberal intervention standards, the “facts and arguments submitted” 
at the post-enforcement stage are likely to exclude some that would 
have been aired during the process of notice and comment.196 
                                                                                                                       
Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
1235, 1259–60, 1275 (2007)). 
 192. Id. at 322–23.  Franklin maintains that this has broad impacts because much, if not most, 
agency policymaking involves interpretations of regulations rather than statutes.  See id. at 323. 
 193. Id. at 322 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  This is Seminole Rock deference.  See id. 
 194. See id. at 324. 
 195. See id. at 316. 
 196. Id. at 316–17 (footnote omitted).  Franklin recognizes that cynics contend that notice-and-
comment rulemaking does not truly foster public participation—since rules adopted through that 
process are effectively finalized before the process even begins—but rather simply compiles a record 
for judicial review.  Id. at 317 (citing Elliott, supra note 9, at 1495).  Even viewing it in that light, 
however, Franklin argues that “robust public participation in notice and comment enhances the later 
process of judicial review by bringing to light technical issues that generalist judges might not 
otherwise spot, thereby enabling courts to engage in meaningful scrutiny of the resulting rules.”  Id. 
at 318. 
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In this way, the short cut reduces the opportunity for regulatory 
beneficiaries to participate in agency policymaking significantly more 
than it reduces the opportunity for regulated entities to participate.197  
Therefore, Franklin supports the courts’ rejection of the short cut and 
maintenance of the status quo.198 
IV. PROFESSOR SEIDENFELD’S DEFENSE OF THE SHORT CUT, AS 
MODIFIED 
Seidenfeld, on the other hand, criticizes both the status quo, which he 
labels “the ‘legal-effect school,’” and the short cut.199  Regarding the 
legal effect school, he argues that the APA authorizes agencies to issue 
nonlegislative rules that have some force, and thus, it is inappropriate for 
courts to strike down nonlegislative rules based on a determination that 
they are binding.200  More importantly, however, he argues that the tests 
used to distinguish legislative rules from nonlegislative rules are 
unmanageable.201  Because nonlegislative rules always involve some 
lawmaking and may have some binding effect, Seidenfeld deems 
unworkable those tests that treat rules as legislative simply if they are 
binding or involve agency lawmaking.202  The tests sweep too broadly, 
discourage all nonlegislative rulemaking, and can encourage agencies to 
make policy through adjudication instead.203  According to Seidenfeld, if 
courts use tests to discourage agencies from using nonlegislative 
rulemaking, then the tests should focus on discouraging agencies from 
using nonlegislative rulemaking in inappropriate situations, rather than 
discouraging all nonlegislative rulemaking.204  Even if the current tests 
                                                          
 197. Id. at 319 (stressing that regulatory beneficiaries often submit comments to agencies 
through notice-and-comment rulemaking “but . . . are generally unable to obtain judicial review of 
permissive or threshold-setting nonlegislative rules”). 
 198. To be fair, Franklin does criticize the current doctrine’s ambiguities and the courts’ bias 
toward procedural formality.  He does not, however, advocate significant change.  See id. at 325–26. 
 199. See Seidenfeld, supra note 13, at 364. 
 200. See id. at 351.  Seidenfeld suggests that the APA implies that guidance documents can have 
some effect because it provides “that an agency cannot use a guidance document ‘against a party’ 
unless the document was published in the Federal Register or was made available to the public and 
the party had actual knowledge of its terms.”  Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 351–52. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See id. at 351–52 (“[J]udicial review under the legal-effect school . . . can result in judicial 
reversal of many valuable guidance documents.”).  Seidenfeld argues that the propriety of adopting a 
policy or interpretation without notice and comment should “turn on balancing the costs and benefits 
of proceeding by nonlegislative rulemaking,” which depends on “such context-specific factors as the 
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do not discourage all nonlegislative rulemaking, Seidenfeld argues that 
they discourage nonlegislative rulemaking in cases where it would be 
most effective.205  For instance, under current tests, policy statements are 
more likely to be invalidated if they are detailed and definitive.206  Those 
are, however, the types of policy statements that would provide the most 
guidance to agency staff and the regulated community.207  Similarly, as 
an interpretive rule strays further from the precise language of the statute 
or regulation that it interprets, it becomes more likely that a court will 
invalidate it.208  If an interpretive rule merely parrots the language of the 
statute or regulation, however, then there is little need for the rule in the 
first place.209 
Seidenfeld also identifies deficiencies with the short cut.210  
Specifically, he agrees with Franklin’s contention that the short cut could 
restrict stakeholder participation in agency policymaking and reduce 
opportunities for judicial review of agency policies.211  Ultimately, 
however, Seidenfeld concludes that the short cut, as modified by several 
proposed reforms, is preferable to the status quo.212 
His article argues that courts should modify the ripeness and finality 
analyses to allow immediate challenges to nonlegislative rules upon their 
issuance and that the challenges should focus on the substance of the 
rule, rather than the procedures used to adopt it.213  He advocates for 
“meaningful” review of the rules under a modified arbitrary-and-
capricious standard, which would require agencies to provide a more 
detailed explanation for the nonlegislative rule’s basis at the time the 
agency issues it.214 
                                                                                                                       
interference with reliance interests, the importance of information known to stakeholders but not to 
the agency, the benefits from implementing the policy or interpretation quickly, and the ability of the 
agency to devote resources to other action.”  Id. at 351–52.  At the same time, though, he notes that 
courts are not well-equipped to conduct such analysis.  Id. at 359–60. 
 205. Id. at 360 (“[T]o the extent that judicial doctrine signals any message to agencies, it is to 
avoid guidance precisely when guidance is likely to be most valuable.”). 
 206. Id. at 359–60. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See id. 
 210. Id. at 357. 
 211. See id. (“[M]any guidance documents are never subjected to ex post review.  Regulated 
entities face incentives to comply with them rather than challenge them ex post . . . .  [A]gencies are 
unlikely to be affected by [stakeholder] participation after the guidance is announced.”). 
 212. See id. at 373 (“My proposal . . . is to add some version of direct substantive review to the 
elimination of ex ante procedural review.”). 
 213. See id. at 373–74. 
 214. See id. at 373–74, 392–94. 
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Seidenfeld discusses a proposal by Magill to review agencies’ choice 
of nonlegislative rulemaking over legislative rulemaking under a more 
stringent standard215 and a proposal by Professor Nina Mendelson to 
allow stakeholders to petition agencies to issue, modify, or repeal certain 
nonlegislative rules.216  He concludes that both proposals are deficient.217  
Unlike Franklin, Seidenfeld believes that the doctrines of ripeness and 
finality provide significant barriers to judicial review of nonlegislative 
rules, and he argues that Magill and Mendelson’s proposals would not 
make it easier to challenge nonlegislative rules.218  He also argues that 
the two reform proposals will increase agencies’ resource demands, 
which may discourage the appropriate use of nonlegislative 
rulemaking.219  Finally, he criticizes both proposals as failing to provide 
a sufficiently rigorous standard of review for nonlegislative rules.220  
Seidenfeld’s proposal attempts to avoid the shortcomings of the Magill 
and Mendelson proposals.221 
                                                          
 215. Id. at 364–65 (citing Magill, supra note 5, at 1413–25). 
 216. Id. at 365 (citing Mendelson, supra note 42, at 443–44). 
 217. See id. at 364–66. 
 218. See id. at 365–66.  Seidenfeld argues that, prior to enforcement, guidance documents may 
not alter legal rights and obligations or impose hardship on regulated entities or regulatory 
beneficiaries.  Id. at 366 (citing Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 452 
F.3d 798, 808 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Indep. Equip. Dealers Ass’n v. EPA, 372 F.3d 420, 427 (D.C. Cir. 
2004)).  Therefore, such guidance documents are not final agency action, and challenges to them are 
not ripe.  Id. (citing Molycorp. Inc. v. EPA, 197 F.3d 543, 547 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). 
 219. Id. at 367.  Regarding Magill’s proposal, Seidenfeld argues that it would be very time 
consuming for agencies to explain why they chose to issue each guidance document as a guidance 
document, rather than as a legislative rule, when agencies issue tens of thousands of guidance 
documents each year.  Id. (citing Strauss, supra note 135, at 1568–69).  Seidenfeld notes that 
Mendelson’s petition proposal could require agencies to use notice-and-comment procedures when 
petitioned to repeal or amend a guidance document.  Id. at 367–68 (citing Mendelson, supra note 42, 
at 439 & n.223).  Those procedures, Seidenfeld notes, would be costly and time consuming.  Id. 
 220. Id. at 367–72.  Seidenfeld asserts that courts are not likely to provide rigorous review of 
agencies’ choice of policymaking tools or refusal to modify or repeal a guidance document because 
those agency decisions involve agencies’ considerations of priorities for limited resources, and 
courts generally defer to agencies in that area.  Id. at 367.  For instance, while the APA authorizes 
persons to petition agencies to issue, modify, or repeal rules, courts offer substantial deference to 
agencies’ decisions to deny such petitions, even though the courts apply, in theory, the arbitrary-and-
capricious standard of review.  Id. at 368–69. 
 221. Regarding Mendelson’s proposal, Seidenfeld also argues that empirical evidence suggests 
that the proposal “would have little effect on agency misuse of guidance documents.”  Id. at 370–71.  
Seidenfeld argues that because nonlegislative rules are “rules” under the APA, those wishing to 
challenge guidance documents can already petition agencies to amend or repeal these “rules” under 
the APA, but few have done so.  Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006)).  Since the availability of an 
existing petition process has had little effect on agencies’ use of guidance, Seidenfeld argues, there is 
no reason to believe that a new petition process will have any greater impact.  Id.  Mendelson, 
however, argues that the existing petition process has not reduced the misuse of guidance documents 
because it does not apply to guidance documents; Seidenfeld responds that the case law does not 
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To reduce the barriers to judicial review, Seidenfeld advocates for a 
modification of the doctrines of ripeness and finality to facilitate 
immediate judicial review of a rule at its adoption.222  “[I]mmediate 
review . . . relieves regulated entities from the dilemma of whether to 
comply with regulations that they believe to be invalid or risk significant 
penalties for noncompliance”223 and could “encourag[e] agencies to 
consult with stakeholders who are not repeat players or politically 
powerful groups when developing guidance.”224 
Seidenfeld recognizes, however, that those doctrines protect agencies 
from a flood of lawsuits that could raise the cost of policymaking 
through nonlegislative rules and “unduly chill” its use.225  Thus, 
Seidenfeld argues that one must narrowly tailor modifications to the 
doctrines to discourage the improper use of guidance documents without 
eliminating their appropriate use.226 
Regarding final agency action, Seidenfeld proposes that courts 
should examine whether an agency is actively considering a change in 
the challenged policy, rather than how likely it is that the policy will be 
changed, when determining if it is “the consummation of the agency’s 
decisionmaking process.”227  More significantly, Seidenfeld argues that 
courts simply should not apply the second part of the “final agency 
action” test—which focuses on whether an agency’s action determines 
rights and obligations or generates legal consequences—to nonlegislative 
rules.228  Regarding ripeness, Seidenfeld suggests that nonlegislative 
                                                                                                                       
clearly support Mendelson’s claim.  Id. at 371 (citing Mendelson, supra note 42, at 439–40). 
 222. Id. at 375. 
 223. Id. at 373–74 (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152–53 (1967)).  Therefore, 
regulated entities “can obtain a judicial determination of [the document’s] validity prior to having to 
comply.”  Id. at 374. 
 224. Id. at 384–85. 
 225. Id. at 375. 
 226. See id. 
 227. Id. at 375 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997)) (internal quotations 
marks omitted).  Similarly, Seidenfeld argues that a guidance document that takes effect without 
further agency action should suffice as such consummation even though a subordinate official, and 
not the agency head, issued the document.  Id. at 376–77.  While subjecting guidance from lower-
level agency officials to immediate judicial review could significantly increase the costs to the 
agency of using guidance documents, Seidenfeld suggests that agencies could minimize those costs 
by adopting a procedural rule that requires challengers as to those lower level guidance documents to 
petition the agency for reconsideration before filing suit.  Id. at 375–78.  While the petition is 
pending, the lower-level guidance document would not constitute final agency action.  Id. at 378 
(citing 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006); Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 152 (1993)). 
 228. Id. at 379–380.  Seidenfeld questions whether the second prong of the final agency action 
test should even apply in cases involving challenges to legislative rules.  Id.  Further, he argues that 
the “second prong of the finality doctrine has no logical relation to the aim of preventing 
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rules that are “pragmatically binding”—that is, likely to affect the 
behavior of regulated entities—have ripened for judicial review, even 
though the rules are not legally binding.229 
Once the barriers to judicial review recede, Seidenfeld argues that 
courts should adopt a variant of the “reasoned decisionmaking” standard 
when reviewing nonlegislative rules.230  He suggests that review for 
reasoned decision-making would encourage agencies to solicit broader 
stakeholder input and carefully consider relevant information before 
acting.231  He admits that review for reasoned decision-making is 
difficult when the agency does not create a record of its action, as is 
generally the case for nonlegislative rules.232  He also recognizes that 
imposing a record requirement on nonlegislative rulemaking could ossify 
that process and discourage its use.233  He does not advocate simply 
                                                                                                                       
unnecessary judicial intervention into ongoing agency rulemaking.”  Id. at 380.  In an earlier article, 
Funk advocated an even broader change than Seidenfeld, proposing that Congress should amend the 
APA to define “final agency action” to include “any interpretive rule or general statement of policy.”  
See Funk, supra note 159, at 1025 (internal quotation marks omitted) (section 3(a)(2) of the 
proposed APA amendment). 
 229. See Seidenfeld, supra note 13, at 380 (“Courts should not impose a requirement that a 
policy statement be so clear as to specify precisely how the policy will operate before it can be 
challenged.  Nor should they find a document unripe because the agency has indicated that it retains 
discretion about whether and when to apply it.”).  Seidenfeld reasons that “pragmatically binding” 
guidance documents impose hardship on regulated entities and regulatory beneficiaries sufficient to 
justify ripeness, even though the documents are not legally binding, because regulated entities 
frequently will face prosecution and civil and criminal penalties if they fail to comply with the 
guidance document.  Id. at 381.  Seidenfeld also notes that “courts often find that arbitrary and 
capricious challenges to guidance documents are not fit for review” because the “documents do not 
indicate clearly when and how agencies will apply them.”  Id. at 383 (citing Interstate Natural Gas 
Ass’n of Am. v. FERC, 285 F.3d 18, 58–62 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. EPA, 145 
F.3d 1414, 1421 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Dietary Supplement Coal., Inc. v. Sullivan, 978 F.2d 560, 563–65 
(9th Cir. 1992)).  Seidenfeld argues that in most cases, despite precatory language, it is fairly clear 
how an agency intends to apply a guidance document, so the document should be fit for review 
despite the equivocal language.  Id. at 383–84.  Seidenfeld’s proposal is similar to a proposal 
advanced by Funk to amend the APA to provide that “[i]n assessing the ripeness for review of an 
interpretive rule or general statement of policy, the court shall assess the hardship to the plaintiff in 
light of the practical consequences of the adoption of the rule or policy.”  See Funk, supra note 159, 
at 1026 (section 3(b) of the proposed APA amendment). 
 230. See Seidenfeld, supra note 13, at 373–74. 
 231. Id. 
 232. See id.  For instance, Seidenfeld notes that while courts apply arbitrary-and-capricious 
standard to review agency denials of petitions to adopt rules, courts do not apply that standard 
rigorously when the agency has not developed a record to support its decision to deny the petition.  
Id. at 385–86. 
 233. Id. at 373–74 (noting that “much of the value of guidance documents stems from the speed 
and ease with which agencies can issue them”).  He further acknowledges that review for reasoned 
decision-making will add to the time and resource commitment for agencies when they make 
nonlegislative rules and that full-fledged hard-look review for all agency guidance documents could 
“discourage issuance even of guidance documents that are valuable.”  Id. at 374–75 (citing Strauss, 
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treating the information that an agency considered in making a decision 
as the record for review, as that could encourage the agency to limit its 
information-collection efforts in order to increase the chances that a court 
would uphold the agency’s decision.234  His solution, therefore, imposes 
a requirement that agencies explain their decisions “in terms of factors 
that are relevant and alternatives that are plausible given the state of 
knowledge available to the agency when it acted,” regardless of whether 
anyone suggested those factors or alternatives when the agency 
developed its nonlegislative rule.235  Seidenfeld argues that his approach 
would encourage more thoughtful development of guidance documents 
by agencies,236 prevent agency abuse of guidance documents,237 increase 
participation by regulatory beneficiaries,238 and avoid ossifying the 
process of developing such documents.239 
V. A DIFFERENT PATH 
Seidenfeld correctly calls for the courts to reject the legal effects test; 
however, his solution inappropriately treats nonlegislative rules like 
legislative rules and likely creates precisely the disincentive for agencies 
to adopt nonlegislative rules that he attempts to avoid.  The remainder of 
                                                                                                                       
supra note 135, at 1467). 
 234. Id. at 385–87. 
 235. Id. at 388.  Seidenfeld argues that “agencies would have to acknowledge well-recognized 
debates in the relevant field about issues of fact and prediction, and explain the substance of 
interpretations or policies announced in guidance documents in light of its resolution of those 
issues.”  Id.  He defines “well-recognized debates” with reference to those “who [are] familiar with 
the underlying predicates for the policy or interpretation,” rather than the general public, but not 
necessarily to include “information privy only to a few stakeholders because of their unique relation 
to the matter.”  Id.  He stresses that courts should “consider arguments that directly address the 
accuracy of information and the plausibility of analyses on which the agency relied in formulating 
the [guidance] document.”  Id. at 389. 
 236. See id. at 390 (“Judicial review can provide a powerful tonic to agency staff members’ 
propensities to take shortcuts and ignore factors that might undermine their predilections about the 
wisdom of a policy or interpretation.” (citing Richard J. Pierce Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency 
Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 68 (1995))). 
 237. See id. at 385–90. 
 238. See id. at 392 (reasoning that because review for reasoned decision-making leaves much 
uncertainty about what factors or alternatives a court will determine an agency should consider, 
agencies have an incentive to seek out information more broadly so they can consider and address 
any factors or alternatives that a court may find they were obligated to consider). 
 239. See id. at 393–94.  Seidenfeld argues that his proposal will not ossify the nonlegislative-
rulemaking process because agencies can choose to use any procedures they deem appropriate to 
develop the information necessary to withstand judicial review.  Id.  Further, the proposal does not 
require agencies to “pay close attention to every detail of every piece of information” they receive, 
as they must only “explain[] [their] decision[s] in light of information known by those generally 
familiar with the underlying factual issues related to the matter at hand.”  Id. at 393. 
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this Article outlines the benefits of the short cut over the legal effects test 
and proposes an alternative to address criticism that the short cut limits 
public and judicial oversight of nonlegislative rules. 
A. The Benefits of the Short Cut 
The short cut is preferable to the legal effects test because it is easier 
to apply, provides certainty to regulated entities and beneficiaries 
regarding the effect of agencies’ rules, and promotes judicial economy.  
Numerous commentators have stressed that the legal effects test is 
confusing and unworkable, can be applied inconsistently, and may 
discourage even the appropriate use of nonlegislative rules.240  By 
focusing solely on whether an agency has adopted a rule through notice-
and-comment rulemaking and whether an exception to the notice-and-
comment requirements applies to the rulemaking, the short cut is much 
simpler to apply.241  The simplicity of the test is valuable to the regulated 
community and regulatory beneficiaries because it gives them greater 
certainty regarding the effect of the rule.242  Courts will save time and 
resources in administering the test, as they do not have to determine 
whether a rule is a legislative or nonlegislative rule until the rule’s 
application.243 
Contrary to claims made by supporters of the legal effects test,244 its 
uncertainty does not encourage agencies to implement policies and 
interpretations through the more publicly inclusive and judicially 
reviewable notice-and-comment rulemaking.  Rather, it encourages 
agencies to make decisions through adjudication, which provides no 
significant opportunities for public participation.245  In addition, when 
                                                          
 240. See supra Part II.C. 
 241. See Franklin, supra note 5, at 279; Funk, supra note 5, at 663. 
 242. See Funk, supra note 5, at 663. 
 243. See Franklin, supra note 5, at 279. 
 244. See id. at 302. 
 245. See id. at 306; Johnson, supra note 3, at 730–33; Manning, supra note 7, at 930; Seidenfeld, 
supra note 13, at 352–53.  While regulated entities and beneficiaries suffer from a lack of 
participation, agencies also suffer “because [they] cannot access the information that those parties 
could have provided,” which could be useful to the agencies in determining the broader implications 
of their decisions.  See Johnson, supra note 3, at 732.  Mendelson notes, however, that agencies still 
have incentives to adopt policies through nonlegislative rules despite increased costs for adopting 
guidance.  See Mendelson, supra note 42, at 435–37.  Agencies may want to give the public advance 
notice of their position because (1) agencies “may wish to treat regulated entities fairly—or at least 
to be perceived as treating them fairly”; (2) “an agency’s failure to disclose its policy positions or 
interpretations would likely undermine its relations with regulated entities”; and (3) “the failure to 
disclose a particular interpretation of a statute or regulation will interfere with an agency’s ability to 
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agencies make decisions through adjudication, the public receives less 
advance notice regarding the agencies’ policies and interpretations than 
when agencies adopt those policies and interpretations as nonlegislative 
rules.246  Indeed, a regulated entity may be unaware of an agency’s 
position until the agency enforces it against it in adjudication.  In most 
cases, the legal effects test simply delays the inevitable application of the 
agencies’ policies and interpretations.247 
Funk identifies another undesirable impact of the legal effects test.  
Regulated entities or future courts may misinterpret an initial court’s 
invalidation of a nonlegislative rule on procedural grounds as judicial 
invalidation of the underlying substance of the rule.248  This might also 
drive agencies to mistakenly abandon a valid policy or interpretation 
without soliciting further public input.249  When courts invalidate a 
nonlegislative rule on procedural grounds under the legal effects test, 
they have not adjudicated the substantive validity of the rule, and thus, 
agencies should retain the authority to adopt the same interpretation or 
policy through adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking.250 
The short cut avoids this confusion and adheres to congressional 
intent by preserving an agency’s discretion to choose its policymaking 
tool.251  When Congress intends to require an agency to adopt policies or 
interpretations through notice-and-comment rulemaking or adjudication, 
it does so explicitly.252  When Congress has not expressly limited an 
agency’s discretion to choose the appropriate policymaking tool, 
Chenery II counsels that a court should not limit that discretion.253  The 
legal effects test limits an agency’s discretion by treating nonlegislative 
rules as invalid legislative rules.  A superior approach recognizes that an 
agency may announce its policies and interpretations in nonlegislative 
                                                                                                                       
obtain penalties for statutory or regulatory violations.”  See id. at 435–36. 
 246. See Franklin, supra note 5, at 306–07; supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.  Professor 
Franklin concedes that “one of the benefits of nonlegislative rulemaking, at least in contexts where 
notice and clarity are especially important, is that it is not pure adjudication.”  Id. at 306.  Proceeding 
through adjudication also reduces the opportunity for agencies to implement laws and regulations 
consistently by providing advance guidance to agency employees.  See Johnson, supra note 3, at 
728. 
 247. See Seidenfeld, supra note 13, at 360–62. 
 248. See Funk, supra note 5, at 664–65. 
 249. See Franklin, supra note 5, at 302. 
 250. See Funk, supra note 5, at 665. 
 251. See Franklin, supra note 5, at 300. 
 252. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
 253. See supra notes 72–78 and accompanying text; see also Johnson, supra note 3, at 730–32. 
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rules, so long as it provides adequate justification upon their application 
in concrete factual settings. 
B. Responding to Professor Franklin’s Criticisms of the Trade Off and 
the Short Cut 
Supporters of the short cut maintain that agencies may occasionally 
trade the binding effect and Chevron deference that comes with 
legislative rulemaking for the low cost and flexibility of nonlegislative 
rulemaking.254  Even so, the supporters argue, many situations will 
encourage agencies to adopt rules through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking in a short cut regime so that the agencies’ policies and 
interpretations will have binding effect and receive Chevron deference.255  
Franklin argues that agencies will not have an incentive to adopt rules 
through notice-and-comment procedures in a short cut regime for the 
following reasons: (1) courts will extend Chevron deference to 
nonlegislative rules; (2) even if courts apply Skidmore deference to 
nonlegislative rules, Skidmore deference is equivalent to Chevron 
deference; and (3) courts accord more deference than required by 
Chevron to nonlegislative rules that interpret legislative rules.256  Each 
argument, however, contains flaws. 
Although the Supreme Court has been reluctant to create a bright-
line rule that precludes the extension of Chevron deference to 
nonlegislative rules, the Court has not yet found a nonlegislative rule that 
has deserved such deference.257  In Christensen v. Harris County, the 
Court determined that Skidmore deference, rather than Chevron 
deference, applied to an opinion letter from an official with the 
Department of Labor.258  The Court reasoned that “[i]nterpretations such 
as those in opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy 
statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which 
lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference.”259  The 
                                                          
 254. See supra notes 168–74 and accompanying text. 
 255. See supra notes 168–74 and accompanying text. 
 256. See supra notes 175–79, 187–94 and accompanying text. 
 257. Consequently, Professor Funk has proposed that Congress should amend the APA to 
explicitly provide that the Skidmore test is the appropriate standard for review of nonlegislative 
rules.  See Funk, supra note 159, at 1041–42. 
 258. 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). 
 259. Id. (citing Reno v. Korny, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 
244, 256–58 (1991); Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 157 
(1991)). 
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following year, in Mead, the Court held that Chevron did not apply to 
review of a tariff classification by the United States Customs Service.260  
The Court held that Chevron applies “when it appears that Congress 
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the 
force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was 
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”261  According to the Court, 
a “[d]elegation of [that] authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as 
by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable congressional 
intent.”262 
While those cases seemed to suggest that decisions lacking the force 
of law, like most nonlegislative rules, should not receive Chevron 
deference, the Court has refused to directly foreclose on the availability 
of such deference for all nonlegislative rules.  In Barnhart v. Walton, the 
Supreme Court seemed to modify the test used to determine when 
Chevron applies.  There, the Court considered “the interstitial nature of 
the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of 
the question to the administration of the statute, the complexity of that 
administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the 
question over a long period of time” to determine whether Chevron 
applied to regulations adopted by the Social Security Administration.263  
Although the Court stressed “the fact that the Agency previously reached 
its interpretation through means less formal than ‘notice and comment’ 
rulemaking [did] not automatically deprive that interpretation of the 
judicial deference otherwise its due.”264  The Barnhart Court ultimately 
reviewed the legislative rule adopted by the Social Security 
Administration, rather than the nonlegislative rule that preceded it, so the 
Court’s discussion of the deference accorded nonlegislative rules is mere 
dicta.265 
Although Franklin argues that courts in fact accord the same 
deference under both Chevron and Skidmore, many commentators 
                                                          
 260. 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 227. 
 263. 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 231–34). 
 264. Id. at 221 (citation omitted). 
 265. As Professor Lisa Schultz Bressman notes, however, lower courts have split as to whether 
Chevron deference applies to nonlegislative rules.  See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has 
Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1459 (2005).  Some courts 
focus on whether an agency’s interpretation has a binding effect, as in Mead.  Id.  Others focus on 
the factors identified in Barnhart.  Id. 
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disagree.266  In fact, empirical studies illustrate clear differences in 
application between the standards.267  In an empirical study of federal 
cases decided in the six months following Mead, Eric Womack found 
that courts upheld the agency’s decision when applying the Skidmore test 
only thirty-one percent of the time.268  Professor Amy Wildermuth 
examined a different set of post-Mead federal court decisions and found 
that courts upheld the agency’s decision under Skidmore only thirty-nine 
percent of the time.269  In contrast, most empirical studies focusing on 
Chevron review either before or after Mead find that courts uphold 
agencies’ decisions under Chevron between sixty and seventy percent of 
the time.270 
In a recent article, Professor David Zaring reviewed several 
empirical studies of judicial application of Chevron, Skidmore, the 
arbitrary-and-capricious standard, hard-look review, the substantial-
evidence standard, and de novo review of agencies’ actions.271  Zaring 
concluded that courts affirm agencies’ decisions at roughly the same rate, 
regardless of which standard the courts apply.272  In his article, he cited a 
review of Skidmore cases conducted by Professor Kristin Hickman and 
Matthew Krueger that found courts upheld the agencies’ interpretation in 
nearly sixty-one percent of the cases.273  The rate of affirmance in the 
                                                          
 266. See, e.g., Funk, supra note 159, at 1034 (noting a perceived “significant difference” 
between Chevron and Skidmore); Amy J. Wildermuth, Solving the Puzzle of Mead and Christensen: 
What Would Justice Stevens Do?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1877, 1890–99 (2006) (distinguishing 
between Chevron and Skidmore analysis); Eric R. Womack, Into the Third Era of Administrative 
Law: An Empirical Study of the Supreme Court’s Retreat from Chevron Principles in United States 
v. Mead, 107 DICK. L. REV. 289, 295 (2002) (referring to Chevron as a “dramatic shift” from 
Skidmore).  But see Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 226 (2006) 
(suggesting that there is often very little difference between Chevron and Skidmore deference); 
Russell L. Weaver, An APA Provision on Nonlegislative Rules?, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1179, 1186 
(2004) (finding little difference between the standards).  Professor Bressman believes that while 
application of the tests might result in similar outcomes in many cases, the choice of a standard is 
important because adoption of the Skidmore standard delegates greater interpretive authority to 
courts and reduces an agency’s ability to change its policies over time.  See Bressman, supra note 
265, at 1466–68. 
 267. See Womack, supra note 266, at 295. 
 268. See id. at 327–28. 
 269. See Wildermuth, supra note 266, at 1898–99. 
 270. See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 170–76 (2010). 
 271. Id. at 169–78. 
 272. Id.  After reviewing twelve empirical studies, Zaring concludes that courts affirm agencies’ 
decisions in sixty to seventy percent of the cases, regardless of which standard the Court applies.  Id. 
at 169.  Consequently, he advocates replacing all of the standards with a single “reasonableness” 
standard.  Id. at 138–39. 
 273. Id. at 174–75 (citing Hickman & Krueger, supra note 191, at 1235).  Hickman and Krueger 
examined 106 opinions involving Skidmore review that the federal courts of appeals issued “in the 
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Chevron case study cited by Zaring with the largest sample size was 
seventy-six percent, however, and several of the Chevron studies he 
reviewed found affirmance rates near seventy percent or higher.274  Thus, 
the studies he reviewed demonstrated a difference between the 
application of the Chevron and Skidmore standards in practice and would 
have demonstrated an even greater difference had he included the 
Womack and Wildermuth studies.  Even Hickman and Krueger, the 
authors of the Skidmore study that he included, conclude that Skidmore 
affords agencies less deference than Chevron.275 
Franklin further suggests that agencies receive a higher level of 
deference than Chevron when they adopt nonlegislative rules that 
interpret legislative rules.  He is correct that under Auer v. Robbins, 
courts will defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations 
unless that interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.”276  This higher level of deference only applies when the 
nonlegislative rule interprets ambiguous language in a legislative rule,277 
rather than a statute, and does not apply when the legislative rule merely 
parrots the language in the statute.278 
More importantly, however, the prospect of Auer deference will not 
necessarily motivate agencies to announce policies and interpretations 
through nonlegislative rulemaking in a short cut regime because agencies 
can receive the same high level of deference for those interpretations 
even if they have not articulated them in a nonlegislative rule.  The 
Supreme Court has stressed, in case after case, that Auer deference 
applies to an agency’s interpretation of its legislative rule even if it raises 
it for the first time in an amicus brief or other legal pleadings.279  Indeed, 
                                                                                                                       
first five years of the modern Skidmore era.”  Hickman & Krueger, supra note 191, at 1267. 
 274. Zaring, supra note 270, at 171.  Professor Peter Schuck and Elliott’s 1990 review of 
appellate court Chevron opinions identified a seventy-seven percent validation rate for agencies’ 
decisions.  See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of 
Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1007–09 (1990). 
 275. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 191, at 1250.  They stress, though, that the Skidmore 
standard is more deferential than suggested by the Womack and Wildermuth studies, and they 
criticize the small sample sizes—and some of the methodologies—of both studies.  Id. at 1278–79. 
 276. 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 
332, 359 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 277. See Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000) (finding that the regulatory 
language was not ambiguous, thus Auer did not apply). 
 278. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006). 
 279. See, e.g., Talk Am. Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2261 (2011) (deferring to 
an agency’s interpretation unless “plainly erroneous” (quoting Chase Bank USA, N.A., v. McCoy, 
131 S. Ct. 871, 880 (2011))); Chase Bank, 131 S. Ct. 880–81 (2010) (deferring to agency 
interpretation advanced in a legal brief); Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 
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most of the Supreme Court cases involving Auer deference involve 
agencies advancing initial interpretations of regulations, rather than in 
nonlegislative rules.280  Incidentally, Franklin’s concerns about Auer are 
misplaced because agencies would have the same incentive to advance 
their interpretations of legislative rules for the first time in court under a 
legal effects test regime as they would in a short cut regime. 
C. Responding to Professor Seidenfeld’s Proposal 
Although Franklin’s criticisms of the trade off associated with the 
short cut may be flawed, both he and Seidenfeld, among others, correctly 
assert that (1) nonlegislative rules generate less opportunity for public 
participation and (2) some nonlegislative rules will not face judicial 
review.281  While Franklin cites these shortcomings as reasons to 
abandon the short cut,282 Seidenfeld suggests reforms to address these 
issues by providing immediate substantive, rather than procedural, 
review of nonlegislative rules based on a heightened standard of 
review.283 
Seidenfeld’s proposal to modify the doctrines of ripeness and 
finality, which would enable stakeholders to bring immediate substantive 
challenges to nonlegislative rules upon their adoption,284 likely 
significantly increases the agencies’ cost of adopting nonlegislative rules.  
Agencies will need to draft nonlegislative rules in a way that anticipates, 
and can withstand, immediate facial challenges.  Such drafting will 
necessarily consume more time and resources than the current process 
for developing nonlegislative rules.  Seidenfeld recognizes that only 
narrow modifications to the ripeness and finality doctrines will avoid 
spurring a flood of lawsuits that would chill the use of nonlegislative 
rulemaking.285  Still, his proposal to allow suits whenever a rule is 
“pragmatically binding,” rather than focusing on a limited universe of 
                                                                                                                       
U.S. 285, 295–96 (2009) (holding that an agency’s interpretation of its own rule is “controlling”); 
Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 397 (2008) (noting the significant deference 
afforded agency interpretations under Auer); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 328 (2008) 
(noting that an agency’s interpretation of its own rule is entitled to substantial deference). 
 280. See sources cited supra note 279. 
 281. Franklin, supra note 5, at 304–05. 
 282. Id. at 303–07. 
 283. Seidenfeld, supra note 13, at 373–75. 
 284. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 213–14, 222–29. 
 285. See Seidenfeld, supra note 13, at 380–81; supra text accompanying notes 225–26.  
Seidenfeld defines “pragmatically binding” as “likely to affect” behavior of regulated entities.  
Seidenfeld, supra note 13, at 381. 
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nonlegislative rules likely to have a significant impact, is too broad and 
is likely to encourage precisely the flood of lawsuits that he hopes to 
prevent.  As previously noted, when faced with increased time and 
resource costs for developing and defending nonlegislative rules, 
agencies will likely choose to adopt policies through adjudication rather 
than legislative or nonlegislative rulemaking.  That trend would not 
increase public participation in the development of the policies and 
interpretations, and it would give stakeholders less advance notice of the 
policies and interpretations.286  Even if the increased likelihood of 
litigation over nonlegislative rules did not encourage agencies to 
abandon nonlegislative rulemaking, it would surely slow the 
nonlegislative rulemaking process.  Consequently, to the extent that 
agencies’ policies and interpretations protect regulatory beneficiaries 
from health, environmental, economic, or other harms, time-consuming 
preparation for immediate facial challenges will delay those benefits. 
More fundamentally, however, Seidenfeld’s proposal to allow direct, 
immediate substantive review of nonlegislative rules287 is misguided 
because it divorces the nonlegislative rule from the concrete situations in 
which the agency will ultimately apply it.  Seidenfeld’s approach treats 
the nonlegislative rule like a legislative rule and requires the agency to 
anticipate and justify all situations in which the agency may apply the 
rule.  When an agency develops a nonlegislative rule, however, it 
generally leaves some questions about the rule unanswered, preferring to 
resolve them per its discretion when it applies the rule.  When the agency 
applies its nonlegislative rule, it must justify its action as reasonable.  
The agency should not have to justify it in the abstract before it applies 
the rule.  Seidenfeld’s proposal requires just this. 
Seidenfeld’s proposal to impose a form of hard-look review on an 
agency’s nonlegislative rules288 is misguided for similar reasons.  Once 
again, Seidenfeld treats the nonlegislative rule like a legislative rule.  He 
recognizes that his modified hard-look review will be difficult for courts 
to implement without a record of the agency’s action to review, so he 
proposes, in essence, a record requirement for agencies’ nonlegislative 
rules.289  If, on the other hand, courts waited to review nonlegislative 
rules until the agencies actually applied them, then courts would have a 
                                                          
 286. See supra text accompanying notes 246–47. 
 287. See supra text accompanying notes 222–23. 
 288. See supra notes 230–39 and accompanying text. 
 289. See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
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record of the agencies’ decisions to review for reasonableness.  
Seidenfeld’s proposal to require agencies to explain their nonlegislative 
rules upon adoption, in terms of all plausible factors and alternatives, is 
too costly and time consuming and will encourage agencies to abandon 
nonlegislative rulemaking.  Agencies will likely need to be overly 
conservative in estimating what factors and alternatives courts will 
require them to consider. 
D. Is There Even a Problem? 
While Franklin and Seidenfeld, among others, raise legitimate 
concerns about decreased opportunities for public and judicial oversight 
of nonlegislative rulemaking,290 a recent empirical review of 
nonlegislative rulemaking suggests that agencies do not abuse the 
process, perhaps implying that reforms are unnecessary.291  Analyzing 
guidance documents issued by five federal agencies between 1996 and 
2006, Connor Raso concluded that the agencies did not issue guidance 
documents strategically.292  Raso based his conclusion on several 
findings.  First, Raso observed that the agencies he reviewed issued 
guidance documents less frequently towards the end of a presidential 
administration, whereas agencies acting strategically would likely 
increase their use of guidance at that time to quickly implement their 
policies before the change of administration.293  Second, Raso observed 
that the agencies he reviewed did not issue guidance documents 
significantly more frequently during times of divided government.294  
Agencies acting strategically would likely increase their use of guidance 
                                                          
 290. See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 5, at 324; Gersen, supra note 7, at 1720; Seidenfeld, supra 
note 13, at 332–33. 
 291. Connor N. Raso, Note, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance 
Documents, 119 YALE L.J. 782, 805–20 (2010). 
 292. Id. at 805, 821.  Raso examined guidance documents issued by the Environmental 
Protection Agency, the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Communications Commission, 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Internal Revenue Service.  Id. at 805. 
 293. Id. at 806.  Raso is correct that it might be quicker and easier to implement a policy through 
a guidance document than through a legislative rule at the end of an administration, but agencies 
might have a greater incentive to adopt major policies and interpretations through legislative 
rulemaking than through guidance at the end of an administration because it would be more difficult 
for the incoming administration to change the policy if it were adopted as a legislative rule.  For 
background on late-term administrative action, see Jack M. Beermann, Combating Midnight 
Regulation, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 352 (2009); Jason M. Loring & Liam R. Roth, 
Empirical Study, After Midnight: The Durability of the “Midnight” Regulations Passed by the Two 
Previous Outgoing Administrations, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1441 (2005). 
 294. Raso, supra note 291, at 807. 
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documents under divided government.  Guidance documents would 
attract less attention from both branches of government, and conflict with 
at least one branch of government over the agencies’ policies would be 
more likely when political parties split control of the White House and 
Congress.295  Third, Raso observed that the agencies he reviewed did not 
issue more guidance documents when Congress increased oversight of 
the agencies, whereas agencies acting strategically would likely increase 
their use of guidance documents to avoid the procedural requirements of 
legislative rulemaking that might attract congressional interest.296  
Finally, Raso observed that the agencies he reviewed did not increase 
their use of guidance documents when agencies faced increased judicial 
challenges to their actions, whereas agencies acting strategically would 
likely increase their use of guidance documents to reduce the potential 
for judicial challenges.297 
In addition to concluding that agencies do not issue guidance 
documents strategically, Raso concluded that agencies did not 
systematically use nonlegislative rulemaking to avoid the legislative-
rulemaking process for significant policy decisions.298  He noted that the 
number of significant legislative rules adopted by agencies dwarfed the 
number of significant guidance documents issued by agencies.299  
Finally, Raso concluded that the agencies did not use guidance 
documents to implement “ideologically charged policy decisions”300 
                                                          
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at 807–08.  Raso, however, measures the number of agency-oversight hearings held by 
congressional committees and concludes that more hearings indicate congressional dissatisfaction 
with the agency.  Id. at 808.  Raso admits that using such hearings to measure congressional 
dissatisfaction with agencies is “imperfect” because congressional hearings may indicate a response 
to important external changes in an agency’s policy area and, more importantly, because the number 
of hearings could increase as a response to high profile rulemaking by the agency.  Id. 
 297. Id. at 809–10.  Raso found a “weakly negative” correlation between the number of lawsuits 
brought against an agency and its proportional use of guidance documents and suggested that 
“additional data would increase confidence in this conclusion.”  Id. at 810. 
 298. Id. at 813–14. 
 299. Id.  Raso defined “significant” guidance documents and “significant” rulemaking according 
to the definitions used by the OMB.  Id. at 812.  Raso noted that 723 significant guidance documents 
were in effect at the time of his study, while OMB reviewed over 10,800 significant legislative rules 
between 1993 and 2008.  Id. at 813.  While Raso found that some agencies issued guidance 
documents at a significantly higher rate than others, he concluded that “the behavior appears to be 
motivated by the agency’s need to fulfill a policy mandate within a time constraint,” rather than 
constituting a pattern of strategic behavior by the agency.  Id. at 814.  He also found that agencies 
used much of their guidance to clarify highly technical details and noted that “the technical nature of 
these regulations required frequent and rapid clarification, which was not amenable to the much 
slower rulemaking process.”  Id. at 815. 
 300. Id. at 816. 
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because a change in the presidential administration reversed very few of 
the guidance documents issued during the study period.301  Overall, he 
concluded that “the consternation over guidance documents raised in 
both the academic and policy realms is overstated.”302 
E. The Need for Reform 
While Raso may ultimately be correct that agencies do not 
systematically abuse nonlegislative rulemaking to avoid notice-and-
comment procedures, agencies’ appropriate use of nonlegislative 
rulemaking to address significant policy issues still raises concerns 
regarding lack of public and judicial oversight identified by Franklin, 
Seidenfeld, and others.303  The EPA’s recent guidance defining “waters 
of the United States” is a good example of a significant policy decision 
arising through nonlegislative rulemaking,304 though the agency has 
taken several steps with that guidance to facilitate public participation.305  
The agency’s guidance regarding permitting for greenhouse gases is 
another example.306  In both cases, the guidance addresses a highly 
technical area in which the agency continually gathers information 
before making a final decision regarding the application of 
environmental statutes to specific facts, but some immediate action is 
necessary to address a pressing environmental problem.  Legislative 
rulemaking would be a poor policy choice for addressing those problems 
                                                          
 301. Id. at 816–18.  Raso found that agencies modified guidance documents less frequently than 
legislative rules.  Id. at 818. 
 302. Id. at 821.  Raso suggests that the consternation might arise from (1) “overgeneralization 
from a few egregious examples of abuse”; (2) “interest groups seeking to reduce regulation by 
consuming limited agency resources with additional procedural requirements”; or (3) “fear among 
congressional staffers and OMB officials that agencies are subverting their authority.”  Id. 
 303. See supra sources cited note 290. 
 304. See EPA and Army Corps of Engineers Guidance Regarding Identification of Waters 
Protected by the Clean Water Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,479 (May 2, 2011). 
 305. The EPA issued the guidance in draft form on May 2, 2011 and accepted public comment 
on it until July 1, 2011.  Id. at 24, 479.  On its website, the EPA posted the full docket containing the 
draft guidance, prior guidance, supporting material for the guidance, and all public comments.  Id. at 
24, 480.  In addition, the EPA solicited public participation through Facebook, Twitter, and a blog.  
See Clean Water Act Definition of “Waters of the United States”, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/CWAwaters.cfm (last visited Nov. 8, 
2011).  Further, the agency indicates that it plans to propose revisions to its regulations regarding 
“waters of the United States” that will supersede the guidance.  EPA and Army Corps of Engineers 
Guidance Regarding Identification of Waters Protected by the Clean Water Act, 76 Fed. Reg. at 
24,479. 
 306. PSD and Title V Permitting Guidance for Greenhouse Gases, 75 Fed. Reg. 70,254 (Nov. 17, 
2010). 
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in the short term.  Although the agency is not strategically avoiding 
notice-and-comment rulemaking in these instances, the concerns 
regarding lack of public and judicial oversight identified by Seidenfeld, 
Franklin, and others307 could easily surface if the agency adopted the 
guidance without providing any opportunity for public input. 
Accordingly, Seidenfeld and others correctly note that some changes 
could allow opportunities for public participation and judicial review of 
nonlegislative rules if courts adopt the short cut.308  They also correctly 
argue, however, that the changes should not impose extensive procedural 
requirements on agencies or significantly expand judicial review to a 
degree that discourages the use of nonlegislative rulemaking.309 
F. An Alternative Reform Proposal 
Perhaps the best way to balance these competing objectives would 
arise through legislation that provides increased opportunities for both 
(1) judicial review of guidance documents that might otherwise be 
unreviewable, such as deregulatory policies or nonenforcement policies, 
and (2) public participation when agencies adopt significant guidance 
documents.  The OMB’s Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices 
embodies a good example.310  The OMB Bulletin requires agencies to 
post significant guidance documents on the Internet and provide notice 
and opportunity for public comment on those documents.311  The 
legislation might even require agencies to submit a notice to each house 
                                                          
 307. See supra sources cited note 290. 
 308. See Seidenfeld, supra note 13, at 364. 
 309. See id. at 373–75. 
 310. See infra Part V.G.1.  In an earlier article, I proposed a more general amendment to the 
APA that would require agencies “‘to the extent practicable, necessary and in the public interest’ to 
‘provide opportunities for timely and meaningful public participation’” when adopting guidance 
documents.  Johnson, supra note 3, at 697.  I further proposed an amendment to the judicial review 
provisions of the APA to provide for a sliding scale of deference for agency guidance documents, 
with courts according agency guidance greater deference when the agency uses notice-and-comment 
procedures.  See id.  On further reflection, that proposal would probably be difficult for courts to 
administer because it provides substantial discretion for agencies to determine what procedures to 
use when developing guidance.  At the same time, while the article proposed according agencies 
greater deference when adopting rules using notice-and-comment procedures, that proposal would 
set Skidmore deference as the highest level of deference available to agencies.  See id.  Thus, the 
proposal in the article would not provide a significant incentive to agencies to use notice-and-
comment procedures, since they should receive Skidmore deference without using those procedures 
under existing precedent without any reforms.  By contrast, the proposal in this Article mandates a 
specific type of public participation for significant guidance documents. 
 311. See Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3440 (Jan. 25, 
2007). 
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of Congress when adopting significant guidance.312  To avoid confusion 
regarding application of the short cut, the proposal should require 
agencies to identify interpretive rules and general statements of policy as 
such at the time of adoption, as proposed by Administrative Conference 
of the United States (ACUS), Funk, and others.313  My proposal would 
not, however, increase opportunities for judicial review of guidance 
documents that “coerce” compliance or change the standard of review for 
guidance documents, as Seidenfeld proposes. 
The proposal has several advantages.  First, although it expands 
agencies’ obligations to solicit public input on nonlegislative rules, it is a 
modest expansion because it applies narrowly to significant guidance 
documents.  Critics of nonlegislative rulemaking generally have not 
advocated for full notice-and-comment procedures for all nonlegislative 
rules.314  Instead, concern focuses on agencies’ abuse of nonlegislative 
rulemaking to avoid notice-and-comment procedures for important 
policies and interpretations.  Thus, there is no need to extend public-
participation reforms beyond significant guidance documents.  When 
ACUS suggested reforms to the nonlegislative-rulemaking process in 
1976, it similarly limited its call for increased public notice-and-
                                                          
 312. The proposal would simply require that the agency send notice to Congress and would 
neither delay the implementation of the guidance nor provide for any streamlined congressional 
procedures to disapprove of the guidance, such as those established by the Congressional Review 
Act of 1996 for major legislative rules.  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 801, 802 (2006).  The Congressional 
Review Act defines a “major rule” as a rule that has resulted in, or will likely result in, an annual 
effect on the economy of $100 million or more, a large increase in costs or prices for consumers, 
industries, or state and local governments, or significant adverse effects on the economy.  Id. 
§ 804(2).  Even if the proposal modeled congressional notice on the Congressional Review Act, it is 
not clear that such legislation would significantly interfere with agencies’ adoption of nonlegislative 
rules.  Between the time that Congress enacted the Congressional Review Act in 1996 and May 
2008, over 47,540 major and non-major rules were reported to Congress under the Act, and only one 
rule has been disapproved.  MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONGRESSIONAL 
REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING: AN UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW 
ACT AFTER A DECADE 1 (2006).  In fact, only forty-seven joint resolutions of disapproval were even 
introduced over that time period.  Id.  Further, a Congressional Research Service report suggests that 
the Congressional Review Act already applies to interpretive rules and policies, although agencies 
have not been sending reports to Congress on those nonlegislative rules.  Id. at 2–3. 
 313. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 739–40.  Without such clarification, if an agency adopted an 
economically significant guidance document through notice-and-comment proceedings—as 
contemplated by the OMB Bulletin and by this proposal—without identifying the guidance as 
guidance, there could be some confusion regarding whether the document was a nonbinding 
guidance document or a binding legislative rule. 
 314. Professor Robert Anthony has argued that an agency should adopt all significant policies 
through notice-and-comment rulemaking.  See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy 
Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the 
Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1314–16 (1992) (recommending that any legislative changes be 
announced to the public). 
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participation procedures to guidance documents having a “substantial 
impact.”315  While my proposal will raise the cost of adopting significant 
guidance documents, it likely will not drive agencies toward adopting 
those policies and interpretations through adjudication or simply 
withholding disclosure of those positions.  As Mendelson notes, agencies 
may continue to adopt significant policies and interpretations through 
nonlegislative rulemaking despite the additional costs because they wish 
to treat regulated entities fairly, or appear to treat them fairly, and 
because they wish to maintain good relations with regulated entities in 
order to encourage compliance with the law and facilitate access to 
information from those entities that the agencies need to administer the 
law.316  Agencies may wish to provide advance notice because it allows 
the agency to obtain penalties against regulated entities in court for 
statutory or regulatory violations.317 
A second advantage of the proposal is that it does not impose 
substantial additional procedural requirements on agencies beyond those 
that currently apply to nonlegislative rulemaking.  Although Executive 
Order 13,422,318 which motivated the OMB to adopt its Bulletin, has 
been revoked,319 the OMB Bulletin is still effective, and agencies have 
complied with the procedures required by it for four years.320  Contrary 
to my early skepticism,321 the procedures required by the OMB Bulletin 
have neither significantly ossified the nonlegislative-rulemaking process 
nor encouraged agencies to abandon nonlegislative rulemaking.  In 
addition, Congress has previously imposed similar public-participation 
                                                          
 315. Interpretive Rules of General Applicability and Statements of General Policy 
(Recommendation No. 76-5), 1 C.F.R. § 305.76-5 (1993).  Initial publication of the 
recommendations occurred in 1976.  See Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the 
United States, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,767, 56,769 (Dec. 30, 1976) (to be codified at 1 C.F.R. pt. 305). 
 316. Mendelson, supra note 42, at 435. 
 317. Id. at 436. 
 318. 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 18, 2007).  Executive Order 13,422 required agencies to submit 
“significant” guidance documents to OMB for review before agencies adopted the guidance.  See id. 
at 2764–65. 
 319. Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Jan. 30, 2009). 
 320. See Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3432–33 (Jan. 
25, 2007).  As required by the OMB Bulletin, agencies have adopted good guidance procedures and 
routinely post significant guidance documents on the Internet.  See, e.g., Significant Guidance 
Documents, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/policy/sgd/ (last visited Nov. 
8, 2011); OSHA Significant Guidance Documents Subject to EO 12,866 and OMB’s Bulletin for 
Agency Good Guidance Practices, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.osha.gov/guidance-
documents.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2011); Significant Guidance Documents, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
http://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/significant-guidance.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2011). 
 321. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 696–97 (arguing that the OMB Bulletin would ossify the 
rulemaking process and encourage agencies to abandon nonlegislative rulemaking). 
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requirements on the Food and Drug Administration, and that law has not 
prevented the agency from adopting important policies and 
interpretations through nonlegislative rulemaking.322 
A third advantage of the proposal is that it is consistent with 
President Obama’s initiatives to encourage e-rulemaking and increase 
transparency and public participation in government.323  Similarly, it is 
consistent with President Obama’s Executive Order 13,563, which 
provides that the regulatory system “must allow for public participation 
and an open exchange of ideas.  It must promote predictability and 
reduce uncertainty. . . . It must ensure that regulations are accessible, 
consistent, written in plain language, and easy to understand.”324  Public 
participation in the notice-and-comment process endures frequent 
criticism on the grounds that the opportunity for comment comes too 
late, at a time when the agency has devoted substantial time and 
resources to developing a proposed rule and is likely reluctant to 
significantly modify its proposed rule.325  The proposal to expand public 
participation in the development of significant guidance documents 
provides the public with an opportunity to influence an agency before the 
agency gets to the notice-and-comment stage.  The process that the EPA 
                                                          
 322. See 21 U.S.C. § 371(h)(1) (2006).  This required the FDA to establish a set of policies and 
procedures entitled “Good Guidance Practices,” id. § 371(h)(5), which the agency adopted in 2000.  
21 C.F.R. § 10.115 (2006).  Pursuant to those practices, the FDA has committed to full notice-and-
comment procedures for “Level 1 guidance documents.”  Id. § 10.115(g)(1)(ii) (2006).  Level 1 
guidance documents “(i) [s]et forth initial interpretations of statutory or regulatory requirements; 
(ii) [s]et forth changes in interpretation or policy that are of more than a minor nature; (iii) [i]nclude 
complex scientific issues; or (iv) [c]over highly controversial issues.”  Id. § 10.115(c)(1).  For 
guidance documents that are not Level 1, the FDA posts the guidance documents on the Internet and 
gives the public an opportunity to comment, but the FDA does not need to reply to those comments.  
Id. § 10.115(g)(4). 
 323. Immediately upon taking office, President Obama issued a memorandum to federal 
executive agencies requiring them to use the latest available technologies to increase transparency, 
participation, and collaboration in decision-making.  See Transparency and Open Government, 74 
Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009).  E-rulemaking is also central to the President’s plan for open 
government.  See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OPEN GOVERNMENT PLAN 1 (2010), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/100407-omb-opengov-plan.pdf; see also 
John Moses, Improving Online Public Participation in Agency Rulemaking, OPEN GOVERNMENT 
INITIATIVE (June 12, 2009, 5:03 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/Improving-Online-Public-
Participation-in-Agency-Rulemaking.  For a brief history of federal e-rulemaking efforts, see 
Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking 2.0, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395 (2011). 
 324. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011).  Although much of the 
order focuses on legislative rules, the principles in the order apply to the regulatory process in 
general.  See id. 3821–23. 
 325. See, e.g., Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Tailored Participation: Modernizing the APA Rulemaking 
Procedures, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 321, 331–35 (2009); Stephanie Stern, Cognitive 
Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Administrative Rulemaking, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 621–22 
(2002). 
JOHNSON FINAL 4/19/2012  1:58 PM 
542 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
used to define “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act 
could be a model for a more inclusive nonlegislative-rulemaking process, 
where an agency proposes guidance, seeks public input on the guidance, 
and modifies and applies the guidance in light of that input before 
moving on to notice-and-comment rulemaking.326  Such an elaborate 
process should not become the norm for nonlegislative rulemaking.  Still, 
it seems particularly appropriate where the agency lacks sufficient 
information or experience to set forth a binding policy or interpretation at 
the outset.  It may also be appropriate where the agency, for political 
reasons, wishes to provide additional opportunities for public 
participation in the development of the regulation or wishes to delay 
ultimate adoption of the legislative rule until political winds shift. 
A final advantage of the proposal is that it facilitates congressional 
action if Congress disapproves of an agency’s use of nonlegislative 
rulemaking.  Agencies will post significant nonlegislative rules, along 
with public comments on the rules, on the Internet so Congress will have 
notice of the adoption of significant nonlegislative rules.  Legislators will 
know what policies and interpretations agencies adopt through 
nonlegislative rulemaking as well as the concerns raised by their 
constituents with regard to those rules.  If Congress determines that an 
agency should use notice-and-comment rulemaking to adopt the policy 
or interpretation in question, then it can require it through legislation.  
When Congress mandates the use of legislative rulemaking, courts will 
no longer defer to an agency’s choice of an alternative policymaking tool 
under Chenery II.327 
G. The Proposal in Detail 
1. Public Participation 
To respond to concerns that nonlegislative rules provide insufficient 
opportunities for public participation, Congress could adopt legislation 
similar to the Clearing Unnecessary Regulatory Burdens Act (CURB 
Act), proposed by Senator Susan Collins, which basically adopts the 
procedures of the OMB Bulletin as law.328  Specifically, legislation 
would require agencies to develop procedures for the approval of 
                                                          
 326. See supra notes 304–05 and accompanying text. 
 327. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 208–09 (1947). 
 328. Clearing Unnecessary Regulatory Burdens Act (CURB Act), S. 602, 112th Cong. (2011). 
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significant guidance documents, as defined in the OMB Bulletin329—
including requirements that the appropriate senior officials approve the 
document and label it as guidance—and would require agencies to 
maintain a list of significant guidance documents on their website.330  
The legislation would require streamlined public participation for 
significant guidance documents.  Specifically, as in the CURB Act and 
the OMB Bulletin, the legislation would require agencies to provide 
public notice when they adopt significant guidance documents.331  
Further, it would require agencies to provide the public with an 
opportunity to electronically submit comments on the guidance, but it 
would not require the agency to provide that opportunity before adopting 
the guidance and would not require the agency to specifically respond to 
comments.332  There would not be a specific time limit on the submission 
of comments, so the public could continue to submit comments as the 
agency applied the guidance over time.333  Unlike the CURB Act, the 
legislation might also require agencies to notify each house of Congress 
when they adopt a significant guidance document.334  Finally, for a more 
limited universe of significant guidance documents that qualify as 
“economically significant” as defined in the OMB Bulletin,335 the 
                                                          
 329. A “significant guidance document” according to the OMB Bulletin, is one that 
may reasonably be anticipated to: (i) Lead to an annual effect on the economy of $100 
million or more or adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the 
economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or 
State, local, or tribal governments or communities; (ii) Create a serious inconsistency or 
otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another agency; or (iii) Materially 
alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs or the 
rights and obligations of recipients thereof; or (iv) Raise novel legal or policy issues . . . . 
Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3434 (Jan. 25, 2007). 
 330. Compare id. at 3437 (requiring agencies to allow the pubic access to all significant 
guidance documents via the agencies’ websites) with CURB Act, S. 602 § 2(c) (requiring both 
approval by appropriate senior agency officials and maintenance of a website to allow the public 
access to the text of significant guidance documents).  In 1992, ACUS recommended that agencies 
label interpretive rules and general statements of policy as such when they adopted them to avoid 
any confusion regarding the nature of the rules.  See Agency Policy Statements (Recommendation 
No. 92-2), 1 C.F.R. § 305.92-2 (1993). 
 331. See CURB Act, S. 602 § 2(c); Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. 
Reg. at 3437–38. 
 332. See CURB Act, S. 602 § 2(c); Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. 
Reg. at 3437–38. 
 333. See CURB Act, S. 602 § 2(c); Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. 
Reg. at 3437–38. 
 334. See supra note 312 and accompanying text. 
 335. The OMB Bulletin defines an “economically significant guidance document” as one that 
“‘may reasonably be anticipated to lead to’ an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more 
or adversely affect in a material way the economy or a sector of the economy.”  Final Bulletin for 
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legislation could require the agency to utilize traditional notice-and-
comment procedures, including providing the public with an opportunity 
to comment before the agency adopts the guidance and imposing on the 
agency an obligation to respond to comments.336 
This Article outlines advantages of the proposal above.  The proposal 
focuses on the types of guidance documents where abuse of the notice-
and-comment system would be most troubling and formalizes an 
administrative procedure that has been implemented for several years 
without significantly chilling the appropriate use of nonlegislative 
rulemaking.  It expands public participation opportunities but does not 
impose a requirement on agencies to use of full-blown notice-and-
comment procedures except in very limited circumstances.337  In most 
cases, therefore, the agency can implement the guidance documents 
while reviewing public comments over time. 
One should expect some criticism of the proposal, however.  For 
instance, Mendelson has criticized the approach taken in the OMB 
Bulletin because, she asserts, agencies will not meaningfully engage or 
review the comments they receive on guidance documents unless the law 
obligates them to respond.338  Although she believes that comments from 
entities with significant political clout will receive attention, she does not 
believe that agencies will address concerns raised by regulatory 
beneficiaries in general.339  Mendelson argues that agencies that fail to 
respond to comments under the OMB Bulletin are only accountable to 
                                                                                                                       
Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. at 3435. 
 336. See CURB Act, S. 602 § 2(c)(3); Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 
Fed. Reg. at 3440. 
 337. Agencies seem to interpret “economically significant guidance document” very narrowly.  
A search of the Federal Register in LexisNexis did not identify any cases where an agency requested 
notice and comment on an economically significant guidance document since the OMB Bulletin 
went into effect.  This was determined by logging in to the Federal Register database and performing 
a search with the following search strings: (1) “economically significant /p bulletin and guidance”; 
and (2) “economically significant /p good guidance.”  Similarly, a search of OMB’s reginfo.gov 
website did not identify any OMB reviews of economically significant guidance documents while 
Executive Order 13,422 was in effect.  See Historical Reports, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoHistoricReport (last visited Nov. 8, 2011). 
 338. See Mendelson, supra note 42, at 448. 
 339. Id.  While the OMB Bulletin requires full notice and comment for “economically 
significant” guidance documents, Mendelson argues that there are very few guidance documents that 
would be “economically significant” and that those guidance documents, while important to 
regulated entities, would not be the documents that concern regulatory beneficiaries most.  Id. at 
449.  Regulatory beneficiaries would be most concerned with guidance documents that reduce 
economic burdens on regulated entities by reducing regulatory compliance burdens, and those 
documents would not likely be “economically significant.”  Id. 
JOHNSON FINAL 4/19/2012  1:58 PM 
2012] IN DEFENSE OF THE SHORT CUT 545 
OMB, as the Bulletin does “not create rights enforceable in court.”340  
Legislation, however, could create rights enforceable in court.  More 
importantly, agencies could never simply ignore comments that they 
received on guidance documents, even if they had no obligation to 
respond to the comments.  When the agency ultimately implements a 
policy or interpretation adopted in a nonlegislative rule in a concrete 
factual setting, it must justify its decision as reasonable if challenged in 
court.  If an agency’s decision is unreasonable when viewed in light of 
the comments received by the agency on its nonlegislative rule, then the 
court could strike down the agency’s decision.  The agency’s obligation 
to act reasonably is independent of any procedural obligation to respond 
to comments. 
Critics might also assert that a proposal to require enhanced public 
participation for “significant” nonlegislative rules might be difficult to 
implement because it is difficult to determine what guidance is 
“significant” enough to trigger enhanced participation.  Mendelson, for 
instance, criticized Professor Robert Anthony’s proposal to require 
notice-and-comment rulemaking for every significant aspect of an 
agency’s policies on the grounds that the proposals would place 
significant demands on courts to determine which policy decisions of 
agencies were “significant” or “important.”341  The proposal outlined in 
this Article, however, avoids that problem by providing concrete 
standards for courts to use to determine which agency decisions are 
“significant” or “economically significant.”342 
2. Judicial Review 
The legislative proposal could authorize judicial review of 
nonlegislative rules that adopt deregulatory or nonenforcement policies 
and that, therefore, would not otherwise face review in court.343  This 
                                                          
 340. Id. at 449 (citing Memorandum from Rob Portman, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to 
Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies 18, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ 
omb/memoranda/fy2007/m07-07.pdf). 
 341. Id. at 437–38, 444–45. 
 342. See supra notes 329, 335 and accompanying text. 
 343. Professor Franklin described a variety of types of nonlegislative rules that fit this mold, 
including rules that set minimum criteria that trigger enforcement, rules that outline safe harbors for 
compliance, and rules that outline a general deregulatory policy or interpretation.  See Franklin, 
supra note 5, at 309–10 (citing Anthony, supra note 314, at 1361).  Although I suggested, in a prior 
article, that it was not necessary to institute any reforms to expand opportunities for judicial review 
of nonlegislative rules, see Johnson, supra note 3, at 733–34, because aggrieved parties could 
challenge the rule’s ultimate application, Professors Franklin and Seidenfeld raise compelling 
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proposal would benefit regulatory beneficiaries more than regulated 
entities because regulatory beneficiaries are more likely than regulated 
entities to be negatively impacted by the inability to challenge those 
types of decisions.  Regarding “coerced compliance,” it does not seem to 
be appropriate to change the doctrines of ripeness and finality to expand 
opportunities for judicial review in those cases, as Seidenfeld advocates.  
If an agency’s nonlegislative rule has a sufficiently direct and immediate 
impact on a stakeholder’s day-to-day business that it affects their rights 
or obligations, the stakeholder should be able to challenge it as a “final 
agency action.”  If the rule does not have that effect, then expanding 
judicial review to address those cases could significantly increase the 
cost to agencies of using nonlegislative rulemaking and discourage its 
use.  Regarding ripeness, if a party cannot challenge an agency’s 
nonlegislative rule because it is not clear how the agency will apply the 
rule in practice, then that will often be precisely the reason why the 
agency adopted its policy or interpretation as a nonlegislative rule, rather 
than a legislative rule.  This is an appropriate reason to engage in 
nonlegislative rulemaking.  Providing for immediate judicial review in 
such cases would frustrate the purpose of using nonlegislative 
rulemaking and encourage agencies to develop those policies or 
interpretations through adjudication. 
Mendelson’s proposal to expand judicial review of agencies’ 
nonlegislative rules by creating a process to petition agencies to modify 
or repeal guidance documents could similarly increase the cost of 
nonlegislative rulemaking.344  Indeed, she recognizes this.345  Since her 
                                                                                                                       
arguments that these nonenforcement and deregulatory decisions may never face judicial review.  
See supra Parts III–IV. 
 344. Mendelson, supra note 42, at 441. 
 345. Id.  Mendelson recognizes that the costs are lower than those imposed by requiring agencies 
to use notice-and-comment rulemaking for all guidance documents, that petitions would not be filed 
for the majority of agency guidance documents, which are generally uncontroversial, and that an 
attorneys’ fee provision could further limit spurious petitions.  Id. at 441–42.  She acknowledges, 
however, that at some point, the costs associated with her proposal could discourage agencies from 
appropriately engaging in nonlegislative rulemaking.  Id. at 442.  Professor Seidenfeld, however, 
disagrees and suggests that Mendelson’s proposal would not impose significant costs because 
stakeholders can already petition agencies to revise or repeal nonlegislative rules under the 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553(e), and that few have done so.  See Seidenfeld, supra note 13, at 369–72.  Although 
Mendelson argues that § 553(e) does not apply to nonlegislative rules, see Mendelson, supra note 
42, at 439–40, Seidenfeld disagrees.  See Seidenfeld, supra note 13, at 369–72.  Mendelson is not 
alone in supporting a petition process for nonlegislative rules.  The OMB Bulletin requires agencies 
to establish and clearly advertise on their websites a means for the public to petition the agency to 
issue, reconsider, modify, or rescind significant guidance documents, see Final Bulletin for Agency 
Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3440 (Jan. 25, 2007), but few agencies’ websites 
include such information.  The proposed CURB Act also would require agencies to establish and 
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proposal primarily intends to increase opportunities for judicial review 
by regulatory beneficiaries, the proposal in this Article to authorize 
judicial review of deregulatory and nonenforcement policies could 
provide some relief for regulatory beneficiaries at a lower cost for 
agencies.346 
Finally, the modification of the standard of review for nonlegislative 
rules is not necessary.  The costs associated with Seidenfeld’s proposal 
could discourage agencies from appropriately using nonlegislative 
rulemaking.  Agencies will likely need to be overly conservative in 
anticipating the factors and alternatives that courts will deem to be 
plausible and explain their rules in light of those factors and 
alternatives.347  When an agency adopts a policy or interpretation through 
nonlegislative rulemaking, it sacrifices the binding effect and Chevron 
deference that comes with legislative rulemaking, but the agency 
maintains the flexibility to modify the policy or interpretation over time 
as it applies it to specific facts and receives input from stakeholders.  
Seidenfeld’s proposal denies agencies that flexibility and requires 
agencies to develop a “record” for nonlegislative rulemaking.348  The 
proposal in this Article, by contract, requires agencies to justify the 
policy or interpretation in a nonlegislative rule when the agency applies 
it, based on the specific case and all information the agency has gathered 
from public comments and the application of the rule in other contexts.  
While a court will still review the agency’s decision under Skidmore, the 
agency cannot ignore the public input that it has gathered on the rule 
over time because the Skidmore factors include consideration of both the 
validity of the agency’s reasoning and the thoroughness evident in the 
agency’s consideration.349  Thus, the proposal expands opportunities for 
public participation in the development of nonlegislative rules without 
                                                                                                                       
clearly advertise on their website “a request for issuance, reconsideration, modification, or rescission 
of significant guidance documents,” see CURB Act, S. 602 § 2(c)(2)(B)(i)(II), but the legislation 
would not require agencies to formally respond to such requests.  Id. § 2(c)(2)(B)(ii).  Further, in 
1992, ACUS recommended that agencies should “establish informal and flexible procedures that 
allow an opportunity to challenge policy statements.”  See Agency Policy Statements 
(Recommendation No. 92-2), 1 C.F.R. § 305.92-2 (1993). 
 346. Mendelson argues that a petition process would benefit regulatory beneficiaries by 
encouraging agencies to “consider a wider range of views before issuing guidances.”  See 
Mendelson, supra note 42, at 442.  Expanding opportunities for judicial review to include 
nonenforcement and deregulatory decisions by agencies will achieve similar results for an important 
category of agencies’ rules at a lower cost. 
 347. See supra Part V.C. 
 348. See supra notes 231–35 and accompanying text. 
 349. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
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imposing sufficient costs on agencies to discourage the use of 
nonlegislative rulemaking. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The time has come for courts to discard the D.C. Circuit’s 
unworkable legal effects test.  Further, when Congress does not limit an 
agency’s choice of policymaking tool, the agency should have the 
discretion to adopt a policy or interpretation through nonlegislative 
rulemaking and justify the policy or interpretation when it applies the 
rule, while avoiding spurious premature procedural challenges.  To make 
the adoption of the short cut more palatable to critics who argue that it 
limits public and judicial oversight of nonlegislative rulemaking, this 
Article outlines a proposal that increases public participation in the 
development of “significant” nonlegislative rules and increases 
opportunities for judicial review of nonenforcement and deregulatory 
rules that might otherwise escape review.  The proposal addresses the 
concerns regarding lack of oversight of nonlegislative rules, and it does 
not impose substantial additional costs on the nonlegislative-rulemaking 
process that could otherwise discourage agencies from using 
nonlegislative rulemaking when appropriate.  Without rejection of the 
legal effects test and other reforms, agencies will face increasing 
pressure to adopt new policies and interpretations through adjudication.  
With reforms, agencies will have greater incentives to provide advance 
notice to the public about those policies and interpretations through 
nonlegislative rulemaking and gather valuable input from stakeholders in 
the development of those policies and interpretations. 
